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"WHO'S THE MAN?": MASCULINITIES
STUDIES, TERRY STOPS, AND POLICE
TRAINING
FRANK RUDY COOPER*
We men have some strange rituals.' One occurs on the basketball
court. A player will make a move around a defender and score a basket.
Then he'll shout, "who's the man?" He wants his opponent to say, "You are
the man." This episode is a paradigmatic description of how masculinities
work.2 Men often act with the goal of impressing other men. We gain our
* Copyright © 2009 Frank Rudy Cooper. Professor, Suffolk University Law
School. I dedicate this article to the love of my life, Daniella Etel Courban. Special thanks to
Mario Barnes, Martha Chamallas, Kaaryn Gustafson, Ruth Jones, D. Aaron Lacy, Cynthia
Lee, Ann C. McGinley, Tracey Meares, Eric Miller, Camille Nelson, Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Hari Osofsky, Marc Poirier, and Bennett Capers and Joanna Grossman's 2007 gender
colloquium class. Thanks to my research assistants, Ann Brown, Kelly Castriotta, Jason
Goldstein, Mike Hackett, and Paul Lonardo-Roy for their help with this Article. Additional
thanks to the staff of the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law for editorial excellence. I
presented earlier versions of this article at the 2006 AALS Criminal Justice Section
workshop, the 2007 LatCrit conference, a 2007 University of Iowa College of Law
colloquium, a 2007 Ohio State University Moritz College of Law colloquium, and the 2007
Criminal Justice Roundtable at Yale University Law School. I welcome comments at
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II use "we" in this sentence because I am a man. This Article sometimes uses
informal language because that is consistent with poststructuralist feminist methodology. See
Michael Awkward, A Black Man's Place in Black Feminist Criticism, in BLACK MEN ON
RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 362, 362 (Devon W. Carbado ed.,
1999) (arguing for an autobiographical stance in male feminism).
2 In short, "masculinity" refers to "the socially generated consensus of what it
means to be a man, to be "manly" or to display such behavior at any one time." Deborah
Kerfoot & David Knights, "The Best is Yet to Come?": The Quest for Embodiment in
Managerial Work, in MEN AS MANAGERS, MANAGERS AS MEN 86 (David L. Collinson & Jeff
Hearn eds., 1996), cited in Annastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, "There Oughtta Be a Law
Against Bitches ": Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK &
ORG. 439, 442 (2002). "Masculinities" are not always exhibited by men and may be
exhibited by women. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black
Masculinity and Obama's Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 633, 634-35 (2009)
[hereinafter Cooper, Our First Unisex President?] (defining "femininity"). I often pluralize
masculinity because "masculinity is not: rather, there are only masculinities in the plural[.]"
Paul Smith, Introduction to Boys: MASCULINITIES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1, 3 (Paul
Smith ed., 1996).
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masculine esteem and relative masculine stature from other men's
acknowledgements of our masculinity. Sociologist Michael Kimmel puts it
best: "[w]e are under the constant careful scrutiny of other men. Other men
watch us, rank us, grant our acceptance into the realm of manhood.
Manhood is demonstrated for other men's approval."3 The need for other
men's approval leads us to constantly call out, "who's the man?." Kimmel
helps us see that masculinities are expressed through encounters where one
man can demand that another man acknowledge him as "the man."4
The existence of the "who's the man?" game is revealed by
studying hegemonic masculinity 5 using the literature from the field of
masculinities studies. 6 To date, the legal literature on masculinities has
focused on employment discrimination and equal protection.7 This Article
3 Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in
the Construction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY
25, 33 (2005) [hereinafter Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia] (explaining masculinity as
a homosocial enactment); see also MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL
HISTORY (1996) [hereinafter KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA] (providing a history of U.S.
masculinity).
4 Hence, the title of the movie, "The Man," in which actors Samuel L. Jackson and
Eugene Levy vie over who will control a drug sting. The movie's poster declares, "Only one
of them can be... the man." THE MAN (New Line Cinema 2005).
5 The hegemonic pattern of masculinity is the definition of manhood that is
dominant in a given cultural context. R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic
Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC'Y 829, 846 (2005) ("The
fundamental feature of the concept [of hegemonic masculinity] remains the combination of
the plurality of masculinities and the hierarchy of masculinities.").
6 The field of masculinities studies describes the ways assumptions about the
meanings of manhood are used to justify particular ideas and institutions. GAIL BEDERMAN,
MANLINESS AND CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1880-1917 at 7 (1995) (defining the field as the consideration of how ideologies
about manhood gain ascension and influence behavior).
7 For a collection of masculinities and law pieces, see the forthcoming reader,
MASCULINITIES AND LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C.
McGinley eds.). See Larry Cata Backer, Gendering the President Male: Executive Authority
Beyond Rule of Law Constitutionalism in the American Context, 25 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV.
341(2008) (criticizing masculinism in popular discussion of the rule of law); Deborah Brake,
The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 13 (2001) (applying masculinities studies to Title IX); Devon Carbado, Men in
Black, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 427 (2000) (explaining reasons for essentialism in black
men's social movements); David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind?: Single Sex Education and
the Essentialist Myth of Education, 84 IND. L.J. 135 (2009) (describing effects of the
essentialist myth of masculinity in primary and secondary schools); Frank Rudy Cooper,
Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance,
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and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Against Bipolar
Black Masculinity] (considering how intersectionality theory applies to black masculinity in
the abstract); Cooper, Our First Unisex President?, supra note 2 (arguing that stereotypes of
black men affected Barack Obama's campaign style); Frank Rudy Cooper, Race and
Essentialism in Gloria Steinem, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 36 (2009) (arguing
that essentialism can cause feminists to miss the impact of masculine norms); Nancy E.
Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wis. J. LAW, GENDER & Soc'Y 201
(2008) (summarizing the relationship between feminist theory and masculinities studies);
John Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261 (2009) (arguing
masculinism is rooted in the Founders' modes of thinking); Michael Kimmel, Integrating
Men Into the Curriculum, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 181 (1997); D. Aaron Lacy, The
Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86
NEB. L. REV. 552 (2008); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the
Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037 (1996) (relating masculinities studies to
feminist principles); Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and
Harassment "Because of Sex," 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1151 (2008) (linking masculine norms
and workplace bullying); Ann C. McGinley, Harassing "Girls" at the Hard Rock, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1229 (applying masculinities studies to employment discrimination) [hereinafter
McGinley, Harassing "Girls"]; Ann C. McGinley, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and
Michelle Obama: Performing Gender, Race, and Class on the Campaign Trail, 86 U. DENY.
L. REV. 709 (2009) (comparing identity performances of Clinton, Palin, and Obama during
2008 Presidential campaign); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359
(2004) (applying masculinities studies to the prevailing structures of workplaces); Camille
A. Nelson, Lyrical Assault: Dancehall Versus the Cultural Imperialism of the North-West,
17 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 231 (2008) (discussing masculinity norms in dancehall music);
Marc Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf" Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of
American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEX. 271 (2003); Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping
in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women From Combat, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 303 (2005) (arguing for substantive equality approach to equal protection doctrine to
address discrimination in all-male institutions); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws:
Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 68
(2002) [hereinafter Vojdik, Gender Outlaws] (arguing masculinity is inscribed in the very
structures of all-male institutions by means of rituals); FLOYD D. WEATHERSPOON, AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1998); Verna L. Williams, Reform
or Retrenchment?: Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 15 (critiquing ideologies behind proposals for male-only education for black
boys).
There are some articles on masculinities and criminal justice. See Katherine K.
Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999) (identifying masculine norms as a
cause of acquaintance rape); John 0. Calmore, Reasonable and Unreasonable Suspects: The
Cultural Construction of the Anonymous Black Man in Public Space (Here be Dragons), in
PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES 137 (Athena D. Mutua ed., 2006) (discussing
intersectionality of blackness and masculinity in racial profiling); Angela P. Harris, Gender,
Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777 (2000) [hereinafter Harris,
Gender, Violence] (analyzing how masculinity effects the criminal justice system); Joan W.
Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning From Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV.
183 (2002) (arguing that white masculinities affect the death penalty discourse); Joan W.
Howarth, The Geronimo Bank Murders: A Gay Tragedy, 17 LAW & SEX. 39 (2008); Cynthia
Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008) (critically reviewing the
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applies the masculinities studies literature to the field of criminal procedure
and asks the following question: How does masculinity affect policing? This
is an important question, given that policemen have nearly unique powers to
make others acknowledge them as "the man" while ostensibly merely
performing their duties.
The short answer is that officers may get "macho" with civilians.8
Specifically, they may enact a command presence in situations where it
only serves to boost the officer's masculine esteem.9 To enact command
presence is to take charge of a situation. 10 It involves projecting an aura of
confidence and decisiveness."l It is justified by the need to control
dangerous suspects. 12 A situation that does not justify enacting command
presence is what I call a "masculinity contest." A masculinity contest is a
face-off between men where one party is able to bolster his masculine
esteem by dominating the other. A prototypical masculinity contest is a bar
fight. Men will glare at each other and ratchet up their challenges until one
party backs down or is subdued. Male police officers may sometimes be
tempted to turn encounters with male civilians into masculinity contests. 
13
consideration of identity in cases about the gay panic defense); Christopher D. Man & John
P. Cronan, Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a
Backdrop for "Deliberate Indifference ", 92 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127 (2001) (arguing
that masculine norms lead to prison rape).
8 By "macho" I mean aggressive posturing, such as pushing people around, that is
meant to establish one's masculinity.
9 Unless otherwise specified, by "masculine esteem," I mean both men's masculine
esteem in their own opinions and in the eyes of others. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1260 n.2 (2000) (contrasting "self
identity," "attributal identity," and the process of "working," or providing signals about,
one's identity).
10 Mary Newman, Comment, Barnes v. City of Cincinnati: Command Presence,
Gender Bias, and Problems of Police Aggression, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 485, 491 (2006)
(linking command presence to aggression) (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent
Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart
Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 545, 563 (2001)).
11 Newman, supra note 10, at 487 (defining term).
12 See id. (quoting Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 563) (describing command
presence).
13 An extreme example is the Louima case in New York City, where an officer
handed his gun belt to another officer and traded blows with Louima in the street. The officer
later anally raped Louima with a broomstick at the station. For a general discussion of the
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The insight that policemen may sometimes enact command
presence in order to stage masculinity contests and boost their masculine
esteem is important because it helps explain patterns of law enforcement.
For instance, scholars have long noted that officers sometimes use their
Terry v. Ohio14 stop and frisk powers to racially profile. 15 The usual
explanation for that practice is racial animus. 16 However, concentrating
solely on race as an explanation for police behaviors ignores the fact that
the overwhelming majority of police officers are men and the
Louima assault, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999) (using
Louima case to investigate the ethics of racialized prosecutions).
This Article does not argue that command presence is never necessary. Certainly,
police officers must be able to control suspects who are acting in threatening ways.
However, it opposes the indiscriminate use of command presence for the sake of
demonstrating who is "the man," and argues that police officers should not stage masculinity
contests with civilians.
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15 See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999) (noting Terry stop and frisks are used
to racially profile). A stop is a brief detention for purposes of investigating a reasonable
suspicion that a crime is afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. A frisk is a pat down of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing for purposes of dispelling a reasonable suspicion that a person
with whom the officer is lawfully engaged is armed. Id. at 10 & n.13; see also id. at 32
(Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining requirements for frisk).
Racial profiling is the singling out of racial minorities for suspicion on the basis of
their race. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz, Do We Want Citizens to Know Their Rights, and If So,
How Do We Tell Them? Bullshitting the People: The Criminal Procedure Implications of a
Scatological Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383, 1413 (2007) (declaring disparate treatment is
obvious in racial profiling). For further discussions of racial profiling, see, for example,
Frank Rudy Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect" From Racial Profiling to Depolicing: Toward
Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH
139 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006) [hereinafter Cooper, The
"Seesaw Effect']; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425
(1997) (describing and critiquing the link between the doctrine and racial profiling
practices); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (arguing we should abandon predictive means of
identifying suspects); Sherri Sharma, Beyond "Driving While Black" and "Flying While
Brown": Using Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2003) (discussing racial profiling of women and how it
changes our perception of that phenomenon and hate crimes).
16 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 203, 219-20 (2006) (connecting racial profiling to racial stereotyping).
2009] 675
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overwhelming majority of those they stop are men. 17 As David Sklansky
says, "one train may hide another." 18 I contend that the desire to boost one's
masculine esteem is a train traveling behind, and obscured by, the desire to
boost one's racial esteem in some officers' decisions to disproportionately
stop and frisk men belonging to racial minorities.
For instance, masculinities studies helps to further explain racial
profiling by noting that the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity
incorporates an expectation that one denigrates racial minority males. 19 So,
racial profiling demonstrates that race and gender intersect; the practice can
serve a dual purpose of boosting both racial and masculine esteem. Thus
far, criminal procedure scholars have failed to see that the use of Terry
stops to racially profile is a product of gender as well as race.
If policemen are using Terry stops and frisks to play the game of
"who's the man?" rather than just to gather evidence of crime, then we need
to change the gender dynamics of policing. I propose that we do so by
changing the cultures of police forces. This can be achieved by establishing
extensive training programs designed to root out the attitudes and rituals
that perpetuate a macho police culture.2 °
In order to demonstrate that the Terry doctrine's promotion of
masculinity contests is a problem that ought to be addressed by training
programs, this Article is structured as follows. In Part I, I propose a
comprehensive theory of how masculinities affect policing. I review the
hegemonic masculinities school of thought, which is the dominant school
within masculinities studies, and identifies the following background
17 Most police officers are men. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN & POLICING,
EQUALITY DENIED: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN POLICING: 2001 1 (2002), available at
http://www.womenandpolicing.org/PDF/2002_Status Report.pdf (listing women police
officers at 12.7%). They mostly stop men. See generally ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 (1999), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/I 999/dec/stp frsk.pdf (detailing racial profiling by
the New York City Police Department).
18 See David A. Sklansky, "One Train May Hide Another": Katz, Stonewall, and
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 875, 877 (2008) (quoting
KENNETH KOCH, One Train May Hide Another, in ONE TRAIN 3, 3-4 (1994)).
19 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 38.
20 On the reproduction of masculinist cultures, see generally Prokos & Padavic,
supra note 2 (arguing police training programs convey hidden lessons about the primacy of
masculinity) and Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra note 7 (describing rituals that inscribe
masculinity in the foundations of male-dominated institutions).
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principles of the hegemonic pattern of masculinities 21 in the United States:
(1) men's concern with the opinions of other men;22 (2) anxiety over
whether one has proved one's manhood; 23 (3) a competitiveness reflected in
a need to dominate other men and a general aggressiveness; 24 and (4) a
denigration of contrast figures reflected in a repudiation of femininity and
homosexuality as well as subordination of racial minorities. Next, I
describe two manifestations of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity:
(1) a chip-on-one's-shoulder attitude known as the culture of honor stance
and (2) an exaggeration of masculine qualities known as hypermasculinity.
Then I identify two important aspects of the pattern of police officer
masculinity that is hegemonic in the U.S.: (1) the predominance of
command presence as a paradigm for police officer behavior and (2) the
unofficial rule that police officers must punish disrespect. All of those
aspects of masculinity come together to create and enhance the risk that
policemen will enact command presence in order to stage masculinity
contests with male civilians.
Having developed a comprehensive theory of police officer
masculinity, Part II tests and applies that theory by considering the Terry
decision. First, I demonstrate that a crucial part of the decision seems to be
animated by the assumptions behind the hegemonic patterns of U.S. and
police officer masculinity. Specifically, I suggest that part of the Terry
Court's refusal to exclude evidence obtained from stops and frisks not
based on probable cause derives from its conclusion that officers sometimes
21 The pattern of masculinity that is hegemonic in a particular cultural context is
"normative" in the sense of serving as the ideal for which all men are supposed to strive.
Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 5, at 832; see also id. at 846 (declaring that
"hegemony works in part through the production of exemplars of masculinity").
22 Men's focus on the opinions of other men is sometimes referred to as
"homosociality," which describes manhood as something one creates in one's interactions
with other men. See Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 33-34
(describing intra-gender perspective).
23 Anxiety describes the insecurity men constantly feel about whether they have
proven their manhood. See id. at 31 (declaring masculinity to be "a relentless test").
24 Competitiveness describes the understanding that one proves one's manhood by
besting other men. See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 859
(contending manhood is proved by besting other men).
25 The manhood characteristic of white, heterosexual, upper-class, Christian men
has been installed as the ideal and contrast figures whose identities deviate from those
characteristics, particularly women, gays, and racial minorities, have had their identities
denigrated. See Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 37-39.
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initiate encounters with citizens for reasons unrelated to evidence-
gathering. 26 The Court later acknowledges that in such encounters,
policemen may be "motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain
the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the
streets. 27
Part II also discusses how the Terry Court's implicit assumption
that officers will inevitably engage in masculinity contests is consistent with
mainstream views about police at the time. This may have subtly led the
Terry Court to favor an answer to the question of whether officers could
conduct stops and frisks without probable cause that allowed officers to
shore up their masculinity. Additionally, I show that contemporary
incidents of police bullying by means of Terry stops and frisks which
appear to be solely incidents of racial profiling are actually instances where
race and masculinity intersect to produce the result.
Having demonstrated the risk that police officers will turn Terry
stops into masculinity contests, Part III proposes responding to such
masculinity-based police bullying by changing the cultures of police forces.
In this Part, I distinguish my views from those of legal scholar Angela
Harris by arguing that the solution to masculinity-based police bullying is to
train officers to enact command presence only when it is necessary, not to
attempt a dramatic change from a punitive to a restorative model of
28justice. Then I detail how training currently fails to properly instruct
officers on when to enact command presence. Finally, I propose that police
training explicitly address racial and gender stereotypes, and that officers be
trained in how to verbally diffuse tense situations.
Having explained how to get police officers to stop initiating
masculinity contests, Part IV concludes by explaining why officers
themselves would be better off if they stopped bullying civilians in futile
attempts to maintain their image as "the man."
Before starting the substantive analysis, it will be helpful to note
that the insights in this Article are most applicable to men. After all,
26 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (contending that such purposes cannot be
deterred by application of the exclusionary rule to other similar cases).
27 Id. at 14-15 n.1 I (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 47-
48 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967)).




masculinities are more often, though hardly exclusively, employed by
men.29 Policemen have a tendency to act in the bullying ways that this
Article describes. Policewomen, because they are subject to the norms of
this male-dominated field, are likely also prone to act in those ways. This
Article does not, however, seek to establish the existence of those
tendencies in policewomen.
I. A THEORY OF POLICE OFFICER MASCULINITY
There is one essay that describes the relationship between
masculinity and the police-Angela P. Harris's Gender, Violence, Race and
Criminal Justice-which serves as a precursor to this argument. She begins
by describing the circumstances of NYPD police officer John Volpe's anal
rape of Abner Louima with a broomstick in the bathroom of a
stationhouse.3 ° She then asserts that "men use violence or the threat of
violence as an affirmative way of proving individual or collective
masculinity, or in desperation when they perceive their masculine self-
identity to be under attack., 31 Because policing is a male-dominated and
masculine field, policemen will be prone to two phenomena: the culture of
honor stance and hypermasculinity. In cultures of honor, men see insults as
reducing their social standing and violence as a means of restoring their
honor.32 Harris defines hypermasculinity as a masculine identity in which
physical aggression is exalted and femininity and homosexuality are
denigrated.3 3 For Harris, hypermasculine policing in a culture of honor
leads to police brutality, mostly against men of color.34 Louima's alleged
assault on a police officer "was a threat to the masculinity of the officers in
Volpe's unit and to the masculinity of New York's finest as a whole., 35 So
Volpe's anal rape of Louima is best described as not just an incident of
29 See Cooper, Our First Unisex President?, supra note 2, at 634-35
(distinguishing masculinities from maleness).
30 For a discussion of the Louima case, see Alfieri, supra note 13.
31 Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 781.
32 Id. at 790.
33 Id. at 793. See also discussion infra Part I.A.2 regarding the culture of honor
stance and hypermasculinity.
" See id. at 796-98 (discussing police brutality).
31 Id. at 798.
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racism, but also a product of anxieties about masculinity. This Article finds
Harris's analysis to be compelling but in need of significant expansion.
Whereas Harris focuses on the culture of honor stance and
hypermasculinity, I will provide a more comprehensive account of the
structure of masculine identities in general and the hegemonic pattern of
police officer masculinity in particular. Delving deeper into the hegemonic
pattern of police officer masculinity, I explain how the basic police
practices of enacting command presence and punishing disrespect express
masculine impulses. I will also expose the risk of police officers using
command presence solely to boost their masculine esteem by initiating
masculinity contests.
In the interest of explaining the impact of officers' desires to be
"the man," this Article brings intersectionality theory to bear on the field of
criminal procedure. Intersectionality theory was built on the insight that the
intersection of race and gender causes women of color to experience the
world differently than both men of color and white women.36 As I have
stated elsewhere, intersectionality theory provides the "insight that
identities are always formed at the place where categories of identity
meet., 37 We are all always "raced, gendered, sex oriented, and so on," all at
the same time. 38 Consequently, the sense of self-identity of a man who is
39also black is distinct from that of a black woman or a non-black man.
We can use such intersectional insights to understand why police
officers choose to act in particular ways. Sherri Sharma's article, Beyond
"Driving While Black" and "Flying While Brown ": Using Intersectionality
to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, provides an
example. 40 Sharma argues that the primary focus of the racial profiling
literature has been on "driving while black" and "flying while brown," the
phenomena whereby black drivers are often suspected of being drug dealers
and Arab-looking airline passengers are often suspected of being terrorists,
36 See generally Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Identity
Politics, Intersectionality and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241
(1991) (defining intersectionality theory); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (creating an anti-essentialist position
from which to analyze black women's experiences).
37 Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 863.
38 
Id.
39 Id. at 864 (describing how the self-identity of a black woman is distinct from
that of a black man or a non-black woman).
40 See Sharma, supra note 15.
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respectively, because of stereotypes about those groups.4 1 Since the
literature on driving while black and flying while brown focuses on men,
and since those phenomena have come to represent racial profiling in
general, the racial profiling literature has become preoccupied with male
victims of the practice.42
Sharma shows that such preoccupation, to the exclusion of female
victims of racial profiling, is an incomplete approach to the issue.
Consequently, she provides examples of racial profiling of women. For
instance, the U.S. Customs Service strip-searched black women in search of
drugs in gross disproportion to their presence in the population.43 Sharma
explains that practice as the result of the intersection of stereotypes about
blacks and stereotypes about women. Blacks in general, and black women
in particular, are stereotyped as drug addicts and as hyper-sexual. 4 Those
stereotypes intersect with the Madonna/whore dichotomy, which
categorizes all women as either "good" or "bad. 4 5 Having been historically
hyper-sexualized, black women are presumed to be "bad" women.46
Accordingly, their disproportionate degradation through strip-searches
seemed unremarkable to Customs officials. That confluence of race and
gender in the production of a practice is the type of intersectionality
discussed in this Article.
For our purposes, the most relevant implication of intersectionality
is that the hegemonic form of U.S. masculinity includes racism. 47 In fact,
the metaphor of race and gender as intersecting may understate the
significance of the relationship between those two forms of identity. The
intersectionality of identity theory has been elaborated upon by post-
41 See id. at 276 (summarizing the way each phenomenon is described).
42 Id.
431 d. at 283.
44 See id at 287-93 (describing the stereotypes).
45 Id. at 290. On the Madonna/whore dichotomy, see generally ESTHER MADRIZ,
NOTHING BAD EVER HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF CRIME IN WOMEN'S LIVES (1997)
(reporting women's narratives on fear of crime wherein they assume harm only befalls bad
women). For an analysis of the good/bad dichotomy as applied to black men, see generally
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7.
46 Sharma, supra note 15, at 290.
41 See infra Part I.A.2 (describing characteristics of the hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity).
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intersectionality theorists who describe the cosynthesis,
48
multidimensionality, 49 and symbiosis50 of identities. Their basic point is that
categories of identity do not merely intersect; they mutually constitute one
another. The meaning of race has been influenced by the meaning of
gender, and vice versa.51 For example, the construction of black men as
rapacious was part of the construction of white women as in need of
protection via isolation in the private sphere of the home.
Elsewhere, I have argued that ideologies of race and gender
intersect in a particular way to subject black men to particular stereotypes.
5 2
48 See generally Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997) (using a cosynthesis metaphor to describe how the intersection
of narratives about race, gender, sex orientation, and age allowed Jeffrey Dahmer to
convince police officers to ignore his abuse of a Laotian boy).
49 See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality,"
"Multidimensionality, " and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001) (defining the multidimensionality metaphor).
50 See generally Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of
Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002) (introducing
symbiosis metaphor).
51 See Patricia Hill Collins, A Telling Difference: Dominance, Strength, and Black
Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 7, at 73 ("[C]ommonsense
notions about gender have long been used to construct ideas about racial difference that are
central to racism in the United States. In other words, ideas about white racial normality and
black racial deviancy draw heavily on ideas about gender and sexuality.").
52 See generally Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7
(applying intersectionality theory to black masculinity). All of this Author's scholarship has
at least touched upon how cultural norms affect black men. See generally Frank Rudy
Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry's "Seesaw Effect," 56 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 844-45
(2003) [hereinafter Cooper, Cultural Context Matters] (arguing that cultural context
influences whether black men are racially profiled or depoliced); Frank Rudy Cooper,
Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther King, 32
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517 (2008) [hereinafter Cooper, Surveillance and Identity
Performance] (reviewing FBI surveillance of King); Cooper, The Seesaw Effect, supra note
15 (calling for synthesis of critical race theory and cultural studies to analyze police
treatment of black men in New York); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Spirit of 1968: Toward
Abolishing Terry Doctrine, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 539 (2007) (arguing an
implicit contract grants police excessive discretion on the understanding they will only use it
against marginalized groups); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment:
The Drug War, Racial Profiling, and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002) [hereinafter
Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment] (considering how stereotypes of black men
help produce pro-drug-war jurisprudence); Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding
"Depolicing": Symbiosis Theory and Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355
(2002) [hereinafter Cooper, Understanding Depolicing] (considering why black men have
been depoliced in certain contexts).
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This Article will concentrate on how the combination of race and gender
influences the behavior of the perpetrators of discrimination-police
officers who racially profile-rather than its victims. 53 Although I am
interested in how both race and gender in combination bring about
profiling, I focus on the part of this equation that has barely been explored
by criminal procedure scholars: masculinity. My hope is that examining the
issue through the lens of masculinities studies will enable us to see that
masculinity norms greatly influence policemen's behaviors.
With these goals in mind, this Part begins by identifying the
hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity. Identifying that pattern is a two-step
process of describing the basic tenets of the hegemonic masculinities school
of thought and then breaking down the elements of the hegemonic pattern
of masculinity in the U.S. Next, it describes the hegemonic pattern of police
officer masculinity. That involves linking the common police practices of
command presence and punishing disrespect with the hegemonic pattern of
U.S. masculinity. Finally, this Part analyzes the risk that officers will enact
a command presence solely to stage masculinity contests.
A. Masculinities Studies and the Hegemonic Pattern of U.S.
Masculinity
In order to expand our understanding of the impact of masculinity
on police behavior, it is necessary to understand how masculinity generally
operates. Consequently, I begin by critically reviewing the hegemonic
school of masculinities studies, and describing the hegemonic pattern of
U.S. masculinity.
1. The Hegemonic Masculinities School of Masculinities Studies
What is the field of masculinities studies? According to an
important review essay by American Studies scholar Bryce Traister, it is a
branch of the field of feminist theory.54 It draws from the fields of cultural
studies, history, queer theory, and sociology.55 Based on insights from those
53 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 968 (2002) (defining police as perpetrators of discrimination and the Court's
jurisprudence as taking a perpetrator perspective).
54 Bryce Traister, Academic Viagra: The Rise of American Masculinity Studies, 52
AM. Q. 274, 276 (2000) (calling masculinities studies "promising as a movement within
gender studies").
55 See id. at 274-76 (referencing several fields that masculinities studies draws
upon).
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fields, the field of masculinities studies presumes that men's behavior is
socially constructed.56 It is the meaning we choose to make of biological
difference that creates our sense of gender.57 An important strand of
masculinities studies goes further and suggests that our performances of our
gender constitute the very gender they are said to express. 5 Masculinities
studies theorists agree that we develop senses of what makes someone
"manly" that comport with the traditions of our particular society. 59
Consequently, we can best define masculinities studies as the
interdisciplinary field that inquires into the ways that "different ideologies
about manhood develop, change, are combined, amended, contested-and
gain the status of truth., 60 An ideology is a viewpoint on how the world is
or ought to be.61 It describes an abstract principle that (it implicitly argues)
should be instantiated in the structure of institutions and the behavior of
individuals. Ideologies are aimed at obtaining hegemony, which is consent
to a particular form of social organization that is gained by means of
persuasion rather than material coercion.62 So, masculinities studies
56 The social construction thesis says that the meaning of identity is socially
created rather than given by nature. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94
CAL. L. REV. 873, 883-98 (2006) (discussing examples of the social constructedness of
identities).
57 "Sociologists of gender argue that gender is not something one has but, rather,
something one does." Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 782. So "[d]oing gender
means creating differences between girls and boys and women and men, differences that are
not natural, essential, or biological. Once the differences have been constructed, they are
used to reinforce the 'essentialness' of gender." Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman,
Doing Gender, 1 GENDER& SOC'Y 125, 137 (1987).
58 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 33 (1990) (describing how gender is performatively produced); see generally SARA
SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER: ESSTENTIAL GUIDES FOR LITERARY STUDY (2002) (explicating
Butler's theory of subjectivity); see generally Cooper, Surveillance and Identity
Performance, supra note 52 (summarizing the application of Butler's theories to Fourth
Amendment doctrine).
59 See BRENTON J. MALIN, AMERICAN MASCULINITY UNDER CLINTON: POPULAR
MEDIA AND THE NINETIES "CRISIS OF MASCULINITY" 2 (2005) (identifying issues for a
masculinities study of the Clinton years).
60 BEDERMAN, supra note 6, at 7.
61 See ANDREW EDGAR & PETER SEDGWICK, KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY
190 (1999) (referring to "ways of seeing the world").
62 See Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment, supra note 52, at 859 ("[A]
social group will try to describe the world in a way that accounts for, but coordinates, the
interests of other groups such that they will consent to a structuring of society that promotes
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describes the ways in which assumptions about the meaning of manhood
are used to justify particular ideas and institutions.
In accordance with Cultural Studies scholar Paul Smith's influential
writing, masculinities studies scholars agree that there is no such thing as a
singular masculinity; rather, there are "masculinities" in the plural.63
Masculinities are subject positions64 taken up by different men in different
cultural contexts. Any form of masculinity is always intersecting with sex
orientation, race, class, and so on. 66 Because of the intersectionality of
identities, there is not one form of masculine identity, but a plurality of
identities, such as a working-class white masculinity, an upper-class gay
black masculinity, and so on. Simultaneously, different men in those
intersectional categories perform their identities differently. Consequently,
leading masculinities theorists R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt
suggest that "we should understand hegemonic norms as defining a subject
position in discourse that is taken up strategically by men in particular
circumstances.... Men can dodge among multiple meanings according to
their interactional needs. 6 7 Thus, I personally might emphasize my
blackness, my heterosexuality, or my being a professor in different contexts
in order to enact different forms of masculinities.
Connell and Messerschmidt's reference to "hegemonic" norms is
significant. Their branch of masculinities studies, which is the dominant
the dominant group's interests."); see also EDGAR & SEDGWICK, supra note 61 (referring to
the idea that "rule must be based on consent").
63 See Smith, supra note 2, at 3 (["M]asculinity is not: rather, there are only
masculinities in the plural.").
64 A "subject position" is a narrative framework through which an individual
interprets her structural place in society. See ANNA MARIE SMITH, LACLAU AND MOUFFE: THE
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC IMAGINARY 58 (1998) ("A 'subject position' refers to the ensemble of
beliefs through which an individual interprets and responds to her structural positions within
a social formation.").
65 See Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 5, at 835 (noting that "even in a
culturally homogenous country such as Chile, there is no unitary masculinity, since patterns
vary by class and generation"); Prokos & Padavic, supra note 2, at 442 ("Multiple forms of
masculinity exist because men (and women) construct masculinity in particular social and
historical contexts.").
66 Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 863.
67 Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 5, at 841.
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branch, is called "hegemonic masculinity." 68 The notion of a hegemonic
masculinity implies that there is a struggle for dominance amongst different
concepts of masculinity.69 It also implies that there is a hierarchy of
masculinities.7 ° Connell and Messerschmidt say that certain forms of
masculinity are more honored and wield more power than others.71
Accordingly, the dominant form of masculinity in a particular cultural
context may be said to be hegemonic.
Masculinities become hegemonic due to specific historical
circumstances and are always subject to being dethroned.72 Traister shows
how U.S. history reveals that hegemonic patterns of masculinities are in
perpetual crisis.73 For example, U.S. literature reveals that this country
underwent a "crisis of masculinity" in the post-Revolutionary period, in the
Jacksonian period, and during and after the Civil War.74 During those
crises, the pervasive hegemonic way of thinking about masculinity came
under challenge.
The pattern of masculinity that is hegemonic in a particular cultural
context is not "normal" in the sense that a large portion of men embody it.
75
68 See generally HANDBOOK OF STUDIES ON MEN AND MASCULINITIES (Michael S.
Kimmel et al. eds., 2005) (collecting essays utilizing the hegemonic masculinities approach).
But see STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, MEN AND MASCULINITIES: KEY THEMES AND NEW DIRECTIONS
(2002) (utilizing a discourse analysis approach to masculinities).
69 See Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 5, at 832 (referring to "the active
struggle for dominance that is implicit in the Gramscian concept of hegemony").
70 See id at 846 ("The fundamental feature of the concept [of hegemonic
masculinity] remains the combination of the plurality of masculinities and the hierarchy of
masculinities."); id. at 831 ("The idea of a hierarchy of masculinities grew directly out of
homosexual men's experience with violence and prejudice from straight men.").
71 Id. at 846. Still, hegemonic authority is exercised by co-opting portions of
disparate points of view so as to make the dominant view palatable to a wide range of
groups. See id at 835 ("Challenges to hegemony are common, and so are adjustments in the
face of these challenges."); id at 844 (accepting that "hegemonic masculinity appropriates
from other masculinities whatever appears to be pragmatically useful for continued
domination").
72 id.
73 Traister, supra note 54, at 287.
74 id.
75 Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 5, at 832 ("Hegemonic masculinity was
not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it."); id
at 838 ("Thus, hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that do not correspond closely to
the lives of any actual men.").
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Rather, it is "normative" in that it serves as the ideal toward which all men
are supposed to strive7 6 Further, the normative status of masculinity vis- -
vis femininity causes it to operate invisibly. 77 As Kimmel says in his essay
Toward a Pedagogy of the Oppressor in Athena Mutua's important
anthology Progressive Black Masculinities:
To be white, or straight, or male, or middle class is to be
simultaneously ubiquitous and invisible. You are everywhere you
look; you are the standard against which everyone else is
measured .... People tell you they went to see a woman doctor,
or they say they went to see the doctor.
78
Barbara J. Flagg refers to the inability to see one's whiteness as
influencing one's behavior as the "transparency phenomenon. 7 9 It may be
that the influence of masculinity is similarly transparent to men themselves;
we might therefore refer to "masculinity's transparency." With the
understanding that hegemonic patterns of masculinities are both normative
and invisible, we can proceed to identify the hegemonic patterns of U.S.
masculinity.
2. The Hegemonic Pattern of U.S. Masculinity
In his book, Manhood in America: A Cultural History,8° Kimmel
traces the development of the current hegemonic model of U.S. masculinity,
"marketplace man." Marketplace man establishes his masculinity through
competition with other men in civil society. 81 One quality of marketplace
man is that he is concerned with how other men rate him. As I note earlier,
"[m]asculinity is a homosocial enactment" in that it is created in the
76 Id. at 838; see also id. at 846 (declaring that "hegemony works in part through
the production of exemplars of masculinity").
77See Collins, supra note 51, at 79 (stating that "hegemonic discourses of
American masculinity operate as unquestioned truths").
78 Michael Kimmel, Toward a Pedagogy of the Oppressor, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK
MASCULINITIES, supra note 7, at 63, 64. Consequently, the privilege of ignoring one's gender
is a luxury only men own. Id at 65.
79 See generally BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998).
80 
KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA, supra note 3.
81 Id at 17.
688 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 18:3
competition that occurs between men. 2 While the accumulation of the
cultural objects that are taken to denote manliness seems to be about
impressing women, it is actually about impressing other men.83 This is the
homosocial aspect of masculinity; masculinity is constructed in interactions
84between men.
A second quality of marketplace man is that he is not only
homosocial but also anxious. He is chronically insecure that he has not
sufficiently proved that he is as masculine as he should be. 85 That is so
because the rules of hegemonic masculinity86 are unrealizable.87 Manhood
is a relentless test of how close you are to the ideal.88 Other men are the
ones who evaluate men's performances. 89 Consequently, men are constantly
suffering from anxiety that other men will unmask them as insufficiently
manly.90
The homosociality and anxiety that are constitutive of marketplace
masculinity reveal a third quality of the hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity: competitiveness reflected in a need to dominate other men.
The indicia of manhood-money, power, women, and so on-are scarce
resources; you can always have more, and they gain their value from the
fact that other men are denied them. To resolve one's anxiety over
masculine esteem, then, men compete to outdo other men in collecting
indicia of manhood. As I have noted in a past article discussing black
masculinity, the principle that we can and should rank types of people-
82 Id at 33.
83 See id. ("We test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks, all
because we want other men to grant us our manhood.").
84 On homosociality, see EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE
CLOSET (1991) (developing theory of homosociality through analyses of literary depictions
of manhood).
85 See Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 36 ("Our efforts to
maintain a manly front cover everything we do.").
86 Kimmel presents four rules of hegemonic masculinity: (1) never act feminine,
(2) accrue power, success, wealth, and status, (3) always hold your emotions in check, and
(4) always exude an aura of daring and aggression. Id. at 30-31.
871d. at 31.
88 Id.
" Id. at 33.
90 Id at 35 (defining such anxiety as homophobia).
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"the scaling of bodies"-is built into Western epistemology.9 1 Behaviors
that seek to express dominance over other men, such as aggression, are part
of the project of establishing that one possesses the hegemonic form of U.S.
masculinity.92 Hegemonic masculinity is tied to hierarchy: one proves one's
manhood by dominating those further down in the social hierarchies.
93
It follows that a fourth quality of the hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity is the desire to denigrate contrast figures. The model for the
hegemonic masculinity that men are trying to demonstrate is the
masculinity of powerful white men. As Kimmel says, "Within the dominant
culture, the masculinity that defines white, middle-class, early middle-aged
heterosexual men is the masculinity that sets the standards for other
men[.]"'94 That is the image of masculinity that is held by men in power.95 It
is also the image that is the baseline in social science studies and popular
depictions of manliness. 96 Even those of us who do not fit that definition,
which is the vast majority of men, cannot help but view the world at least
partly through the dominant lens.97
Since the idealized figure of the powerful white male is the model
for hegemonic masculinity, demonstrating that one fits into the hegemonic
pattern of U.S. masculinity involves a repudiation of that model's contrast
figures, most notably, women, gays, and racial minorities. 98 As I have noted
in the context of heterosexual black men, "emulating normative white men
means emulating a version of masculinity that is based on the dominance of
91 Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 870-73 (explicating
the concept); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 126-
28 (1990) (defining the concept).
92 See Collins, supra note 51, at 86 (declaring that "[p]hysical dominance,
aggressiveness, and the use of violence to maintain male power constitute a central feature in
the definitions of hegemonic white masculinity..."); Cooper, Our First Unisex President?,
supra note 2, at 649 (defining an expectation of aggressiveness as a masculine norm).
93 See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 859 (describing
the effects of normative masculinity upon heterosexual black men).
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those below you in the identity hierarchies." 99 Most of all, masculinity is the
repudiation of femininity.100 Because homoerotic desire is depicted as
feminine desire, the repudiation of homosexual men is a necessary
component of hegemonic masculinitylUI Finally, men from minority groups
are repudiated as either feminized men or men so excessively masculine as
to be bestial. 10 2 Historically, Europeans and children, black chattel
bondspeople, Native Americans, the Irish, Italians, Jews, and Asian men
have all been figured as demeaned Others in the construction of hegemonic
U.S. masculinity. 0 3 That process is continued today by "white working-
class men who wish to think they have a continued edge on 'Others'-
people of color and white women."' 1 4 On the whole, then, the hegemonic
pattern of U.S. masculinity is characterized by homosociality, anxiety,
competitiveness, and the denigration of contrast figures.
A manifestation of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity is the
culture of honor stance. In cultures of honor, according to social
psychologists Dov Cohen and Joe Vandello in their article Meanings of
Violence, one must protect one's social standing by all means necessary,
including violence.'0 5 Cultures of honor originate in situations where one's
99 Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, 896 (arguing that
predominant representations of heterosexual black men seek to seduce us into accepting the
existing hierarchies of identity); see also Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 785
(declaring that "masculinities of all varieties share in common the requirement that men
establish themselves on the ground of what they are not").
100 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 30. See also Athena D.
Mutua, Theorizing Progressive Black Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES,
supra note 7, at 3, 12. ("Masculinity, the positive side of the male-female, man-woman
dichotomy, is thus defined as opposing and superior to the feminine.").
101 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 34.
102 Id. at 38. On the depiction of black males as bestial, see N. Jeremi Duru, The
Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1315 (2004) (describing the bestial black male image); see also Cooper, Against
Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 7, at 875-79 (describing the "Bad Black Man"
image).
103 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 38.
104 Michelle Fine et al., (In)Secure Times: Constructing White Working-Class
Masculinities in the Late 20th Century, 11 GENDER & SOC'¥ 52, 53 (1997) (analyzing studies
of the opinions of working-class white boys and men).




livelihood can easily be stolen. For example, herdsmen must adopt a tough
stance that deters predators. 10 6 In such cultures, an insult drastically reduces
one's social standing because an insult that goes unanswered suggests that
its subject is unable or unwilling to protect himself and, thus, less than
manly.'0° In such a situation, words become akin to the proverbial sticks
and stones. People react to insults as they might to physical attacks because
insults are seen as probes to determine one's manliness.'0 8 This links
manliness to violence because a man's reputation depends on his posing a
credible threat of harm to anyone who challenges him.'0 9 The culture of
honor stance helps explain police punishment of perceived disrespect,
which I detail in Part I.B, below. For now, it suffices to say that taking a
culture of honor stance is one manifestation of the hegemonic pattern of
U.S. masculinity because men tend to adopt this stance when they want to
establish their masculinity.
Because not all men can fully achieve the hegemonic brand of
masculinity, a second manifestation of hegemonic masculinity is
hypermasculinity. Hypermasculinity is a manifestation of the hegemonic
pattern of U.S. masculinity in the sense that it is a reaction to the norm. The
theory of the hypermasculine male is that a man who is denied the stature of
the normative man becomes hypermasculine to compensate for the fact that
he cannot meet the masculine cultural ideal.'1 0 In our society, the normative
man possesses "intellectual mastery, technological prowess, and
rationalized control.""' Because the class hierarchy is intertwined with the
hierarchy of masculinities, men who do not possess these traits are denied
access to both class privilege and masculinity. 12 Working class men who
take orders or lack status in other ways often resort to hypermasculinity in
an attempt to regain social status.' 13 They belittle or harass weaker men,
116 Id. at 569.
107 Id. at 569-70.
108 Id. at 570.
09 Id. at 570-71.
"°Id. at 785; see also Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The
Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & Soc'y 527, 531
(1996) (defining the roots of hypermasculinity).
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women, and gays. So, weight-lifting, bragging about sexual exploits, and
homophobic jokes can all be hypermasculine behaviors. 1 4 We might say
that such hypermasculine behaviors are both a product of the existence of a
normative masculinity and themselves a dominant way in which working-
class men seek to establish their masculinity.
Not surprisingly, given the working-class backgrounds of most
policemen, there is a close association between hypermasculinity and police
work. That association is seen in the qualifications for the job: the size
requirements, upper body strength prerequisite, and the ability to beat
someone into submission.1 5 Harris maintains that the hypermasculinity in
policing "leads to a culture where violence is always just below the
surface."' 16 Men are generally on the lookout for signs of disrespect, so
when a male police officer's masculinity is questioned, he may engage in
police brutality. 17 Thus, the policeman's culture of honor stance and
hypermasculine brutality reflect the hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity. 118
"14 See, e.g., Philip J. Sweitzer, Drug Enforcement in Crisis: Cops on Steroids, 2
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTMP. PROBS. 193 (2004); see also infra Part 1.B (discussing the
linkage between command presence and police officer steroid abuse).
115 Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 793-94.
"6 Id. at 796.
17Id. at 798.
S18 One potential objection to my analysis so far would be to say, "so what?" That
is, one might simply take the hegemonic pattern of masculinity as a given, or even as the
"natural" way of things. My response is that the present hegemonic pattern of masculinity
needs to be changed. Legal scholar David S. Cohen provides a useful description of the
problems with the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity in the context of single-sex
primary and secondary schooling. The first problem he points to is that boys who do not
exhibit the hegemonic masculinity are harassed. Cohen, supra note 7, at 171. This manifests
itself in verbal and physical bullying of boys who do not fit the hegemonic pattern of
behavior. Id. A second problem is that hegemonic masculinity is consistent with domination
of women. Id. at 172. In schools, it leads to verbal, physical, and sexual harassment of girls.
Id. A final problem is that, because no boy can fully embody it, the hegemonic pattern of
masculinity both constrains the boys who seek to adopt it and reinforces the sense of anxiety
that leads to the culture of honor stance and hypermasculinity. Id. at 172-73. It constrains the
boys who seek to adopt it because it drastically narrows the acceptable ways in which they
can exhibit their identities. It creates anxiety because no boy can fully embody the standard,
and they are thus left to adopt the culture of honor stance and hypermasculinity in order to
reassert their manhood. See id. at 173 (arguing that no boy can always live consistently with
hegemonic masculinity). This final problem of feeling the need to establish one's own
masculinity by means of dominating other men is especially prominent in the hegemonic
pattern of police officer masculinity. One might note as well that the single-sex context
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B. The Hegemonic Pattern of Police Masculinity
Given what we have learned about the anxiety that is inherent in the
hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity, we should expect policing, a
paradigmatically masculine field, to reflect a desire to prove oneself. It is,
therefore, unsurprising that the main component of police officer
masculinity is an emphasis on demonstrating the aggressive demeanor
known as command presence. A corollary of that attitude is that police
officers feel the need to punish disrespect. Both enacting command
presence and punishing disrespect are acts consistent with the hegemonic
pattern of U.S. masculinity. Together, they constitute a hegemonic pattern
of masculinity that is peculiar to police officers. The next section
establishes that the adoption of command presence and punishment of
disrespect are norms police officers are expected to follow.
L "Command Presence"
One way in which the hegemonic pattern of police officer
masculinity plays out at the macro level is through the definition of the job
itself as masculine. As criminologist Susan Martin puts it, "[s]ince a key
element of policing-gaining and maintaining control of situations-
remains associated with manhood, male officers do gender along with doing
dominance."119 Similarly, criminologist James Messerschmidt notes that
police officers who work on the streets define patrolling their beats as
manly and administrative tasks as feminine. 120 Criminologist Steve Herbert
goes so far as to define machismo, in the form of seeking opportunities to
insert oneself into dangerous situations, as a central element of police
culture. 121 Martin says that while the demographics of major police
departments have changed significantly, police culture continues to require
highlights the fact that gender is more than just a form of classification; it is a process of
exclusion that occurs through the practices of institutions. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra
note 7, at 112 (arguing that hegemonic masculinity was so embedded in all-male military
institutions that the price of equality for those women who integrate them is to be unlike
most women, to be "gender outlaws").
119 Susan Ehrlich Martin, Police Force or Police Service?: Gender and Emotional
Labor, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 111, 117 (1999) (contending police officers
engage in emotional labor when interacting with suspects).
120 JAMES W. MESSERSCHMIDT, MASCULINITIES AND CRIME 179 (1993).
121 See STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF
COMMUNITY 97 (2006) (defining aspects of police culture).
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that female officers act in masculine ways to achieve acceptance. 122 An
overarching characteristic of policing, therefore, is its definition as a
masculine job.
At the micro level, the masculine influence upon police officer
behavior is seen in the requirement that officers demonstrate a "command
presence." An officer has command presence when he projects an aura of
confidence. 12 3 He demonstrates it by showing people that he is in charge
and decisive.' 24 Officers also demonstrate command presence when they
proactively seek out crime.125 Not surprisingly, command presence is linked
to aggressiveness. 126 Policing based on command presence is thus
antithetical to policing based on negotiation and problem-solving. 127 An
emphasis on command presence has been linked to incidents of excessive
force in both Cincinnati and Los Angeles.' 28 Despite those problems,
command presence remains a characteristic of policing throughout the
country. 1
29
The aggressiveness that characterizes command presence is linked
to masculinity. For example, in the case of Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the
122 Martin, supra note 119, at 116 (arguing that the end of homogeneity in police
forces has not ended masculine norms).
123 Newman, supra note 10, at 487 (defining term).
124 Id. at 491 (linking command presence to aggression) (quoting Chemerinsky,
supra note 10, at 563).
125 Id. (describing command presence) (quoting Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at
563).
126 Id. (connecting command presence to excessive force) (quoting INDEPENDENT
COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEPT., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 83 (1991), available at
http://www.parc.info/client files/Special%20Reports/1%20-%20Chistopher%20
Commision.pdf [hereinafter INDEP. COMM'N REPORT]).
127 See id. at 488 (detailing gender significance of command presence) (quoting
THE WOMEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE L.A. POLICE COMM'N, A BLUEPRINT FOR
IMPLEMENTING GENDER EQUITY 1N THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1993)).
128 Id. at 491 (blaming command presence for excessive force). For descriptions of
how police swung between aggressive racial profiling and resentful depolicing in Cincinnati
and Los Angeles, see Cooper, Understanding Depolicing, supra note 52 (comparing and
contrasting depolicing and racial profiling).
129 See generally Newman, supra note 10 (associating command presence with
policing).
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Cincinnati Police Department denied a promotion to a male police officer
who cross-dressed as a female when off-duty.1 30 The City's defense to the
discrimination claim was that Barnes lacked a command presence. 131 The
Sixth Circuit held that Barnes was actually denied the promotion due to his
failure to appear masculine.' 32 For instance, one of Barnes' supervisors
explicitly linked his lack of command presence to Barnes' feminine
grooming habits and lack of masculine mannerisms.133 Command presence
was also understood in masculine terms in Los Angeles.1 34 Accordingly,
command presence is not just a characteristic of policing in general, but of
police officer masculinity in particular.
Consideration of the theory of hegemonic masculinity helps explain
why police officers' command presence is linked to masculinity. First,
requiring a dominating presence, one of the traits of the hegemonic pattern
of U.S. masculinity, emphasizes the masculine nature of the job.1 35 Second,
enacting a command presence facilitates officers' adherence to hegemonic
masculinity's admonition not to act feminine.1 36 Third, and most
significantly, the desire to exhibit a command presence leads many
policemen to engage in practices associated with hypermasculinity. For
example, Philip Sweitzer, in his article Drug Law Enforcement in Crisis:
Cops on Steroids,137 demonstrates that officers are particularly likely to
engage in excessive weight-lifting. Sweitzer argues that the war on drugs
has created a hypermasculine ideal of the police officer. 138 Because police
130 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1003 (2005).
131 Id. at 735.
132 id.
133 Id. at 734-35.
134 See Newman, supra note 10, at 488 (reviewing Women's Advisory Council
criticisms of command presence as a job requirement).
135 See, e.g., MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 120, at 184 (describing definition of job
as masculine); see also Kristen A. Myers et al., Officer Friendly and the Tough Cop: Gays
and Lesbians Navigate Homophobia and Policing, 47 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 17, 18 (2004).
136 See Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 31-33 (declaring
repudiation of the feminine to be prime directive of masculinity).
137 Sweitzer, supra note 114.
131ld. at 193.
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officers think of themselves as often engaged in situations requiring
physical force to subdue suspects, they have developed a culture of
strength.139 One product of that culture is rampant steroid abuse. 140 Sweitzer
points out that steroid use is not in fact related to a bona fide occupational
need, as officers often bulk up strictly for cosmetic purposes.1 41 He goes so
far as to argue that, for some officers, "the reason they chose to become
police officers is psychologically inextricably intertwined with their
bodybuilding impulse. ' 142 We should be concerned, then, that the
occasional necessity of enacting command presence becomes an excuse for
a culture of strength. 43 Sweitzer concludes that steroids "are being used to
achieve a professional aesthetic tied specifically to presenting a physically
imposing and deterring image.' 44
Ultimately, then, we ought to view the requirement of exhibiting a
command presence as an aspect of the masculine nature of policing. Since
officers are often free to interpret a situation as requiring either aggression
or negotiation, the choice to enact the command presence can be a means of
performing one's masculinity in the hegemonic way. 45 As a consequence,
the norm that officers should exhibit a command presence is hegemonic in
the occupation of policing and reflective of the general hegemonic pattern
of U.S. masculinity.
139 See id. at 195 (noting prevalence of strength-based police athletic
competitions).
1
40 Id. (calling this a not-so-quiet secret).
141 Id. at 209.
142 Id. at 209-10.
143 See id. at 226 (concluding the police culture of strength and toughness
"predisposes police officers to steroid use"); see also id. at 213 (arguing that "cops on
steroids are simply the natural evolution of a conscious decision by the federal government
to promote military authoritarianism in drug enforcement, and the implementation of
military technologies").
144 Id. at 227 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 227 (arguing steroid use
"becomes enmeshed with the officer's identity, the presentation of his physique an integral
part of his personality").
145 Martin, supra note 119, at 115 ("Since the character of the incident often is in
the eye of the beholder, policing becomes a site for competing ways of doing gender.").
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2. Policemen as Punishing Disrespect
Another expression of masculinity that is thought to be central to
the task of policing is the punishment of disrespect. Punishment of
disrespect stems from the fact that police officers demand deference to the
badge. In doing so, they often act more out of a desire to preserve their
authority than to enforce a law. 146 That attitude is explained by political
scientist Harlan Hahn, who says that police officers likely find the
opportunity to control other men to be a major attraction of the job. 147 But
this goes beyond a general enactment of command presence, for they often
punish disrespect for the police by using force.
148
The reason police officers punish disrespect is that, for them, a
challenge to their respect is a challenge to their manhood. According to
Sociologist James F. Scott, officers are preoccupied with respect because
within the police role "there is a distinct connotation of masculinity, virility,
aggressiveness, and all the qualities considered worthy of being a man.
Hence, to make depreciatory remarks about the police role is to cast
aspersion upon the policemen's conceptions of themselves as men." 149
Hahn contends, "[i]n many encounters, police officers take actions
primarily to preserve and protect their authority rather than to secure
compliance with the law or to promote respect for law enforcement."' 50
Hence, "[a]lthough 'disrespect for the police' never has been recognized by
the law as a legitimate justification for the use of force or violence, many
policemen adopt the attitude that force can be applied to gain
deference... ,,151 The policeman's fear that a challenge to his authority is a
challenge to his manhood is consistent with the masculine anxiety that I
previously identify as a part of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity.
Police punishment of disrespect is also consistent with the culture of honor
146 Id. at 463.
147 Harlan Hahn, A Profile of Urban Police, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 449, 460
(1971).
148 Id. at 465; see also Martin, supra note 119, at 115 ("The informal norms of this
work culture include the expectations that an officer will ... punish displays of disrespect for
the police.").
149 James F. Scott, Racial Group Membership, Role Orientation, and Police
Conduct Among Urban Policemen, 31 PHYLON 5, 12 (1970).
150 Hahn, supra note 147, at 463.
151 Id. at 465.
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stance. Again, then, police punishment of disrespect is both hegemonic in
the occupation of policing and reflective of the general hegemonic pattern
of U.S. masculinity.
C. The Result of the Hegemonic Patterns of U.S. and Police Officer
Masculinity: Policemen as Seeking Masculinity Contests
In the previous section, I described the hegemonic pattern of police
officer masculinity. In this Part, I discuss the risk that officers will stage
what can be termed "masculinity contests." Masculinity contests are
interactions between men where each side is subject to a masculinity
challenge and only one side will be able to perform his identity in a way
that bolsters his masculine esteem. A "masculinity challenge" is an
interactional threat to one's manhood or a situation in which expectations
about masculine behavior are unachievable. 52 Being challenged to a fight is
a paradigmatic interactional masculinity challenge because backing down
might lead one to be perceived as less manly. The expectation to remain
unemotional in the face of tragedy is a prime example where expectations
for masculine behavior might be unachievable. In both of those cases, men
may feel they must act according to the paradigm in order to demonstrate
they are masculine. Consistent with the theories of cultures of honor and of
hypermasculinity, when men perceive challenges to their masculinity they
seek ways to demonstrate their manliness. 
153
In legal scholarship, Ann C. McGinley has come closest to
describing a theory of masculinity contests. In her article Harassing
"Girls" at the Hard Rock, McGinley argues that male customers effectively
play a game of "who's the man?" in casinos. 15 4 Using the Hard Rock casino
in Las Vegas as a case study, she demonstrates that some casinos
152 James W. Messerschmidt, Becoming "Real Men ": Adolescent Masculinity
Challenges and Sexual Violence, 2 MEN AND MASCUIINITIES 286, 298 (2000).
Messerschmidt discusses the life histories of two boys who end up sexually assaulting under-
aged girls. Because each boy faces teasing at school over his manliness and is told by his
male figure at home that he should defend himself, but finds he cannot do so, each faces a
masculinity challenge that degrades his sense of masculinity. These challenges cause the
boys to seek out masculine resources, ways to demonstrate they are "manly." Id. at 305.
Sadly, the boys Messerschmidt interviewed reconstruct senses of masculine self-worth by
sexually subordinating underaged girls. Id. at 303.
153 id.
154 See generally McGinley, Harassing "Girls," supra note 7 (identifying
behaviors of male customers toward female employees).
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intentionally create sexualized environments. 155 Men may face a challenge
to their masculinity when they are beaten by a woman and respond by using
whatever resources are available to them for rebuilding their masculine
esteem. Utilizing some of Kimmel's work, McGinley shows that men
sometimes bolster their senses of masculine esteem by either competing
with other men for the women's attention or degrading women who have
beaten them.
156
It seems clear that police-civilian encounters are quite capable of
presenting a greater masculinity challenge than that described by McGinley.
The civilian faces a masculinity challenge because the officer's restriction
of his freedom is changing him from a presumptively innocent citizen to a
suspect. The civilian may be spread-eagled against a wall as peers pass by
gawking. Police officers also face a masculinity challenge, however, since,
as a matter of both their roles as law enforcers and their senses of self, they
cannot stand any challenge to their authority.1 57 That is why officers punish
disrespect. Certainly, there is some legitimacy to the idea that officer safety
requires that they be able to control the movements of dangerous suspects
with whom they are actively engaged.15 8 However, the more important
reason why officers seek complete control of citizens is that their sense of
masculine esteem is tied to being shown respect by citizens. When officers
feel disrespected, they face a masculinity challenge. Since manhood is
demonstrated for other men's approval and the overwhelming majority of
both officers and suspects are male, officers may often view the police-
civilian encounter as an opportunity to stage a masculinity contest.
A variety of scholars support the view that police-civilian
encounters function as a sort of masculinity contest. For instance,
criminologist James Hudson takes such a view of the police-civilian
encounter in his article, Police-Citizen Encounters That Lead to Citizen
Complaints.'59 Utilizing sociologist Erving Goffman's influential theories
' Id. at 1231 (identifying the Hard Rock as the casino most interested in creating
a sexualized environment).
156 Id. at 1262 (describing customer dissatisfaction with losing a "man's game" to a
woman).
157 See Scott, supra note 149, at 12 (describing police as feeling that their
masculinity is challenged when their authority is challenged).
158 See James R. Hudson, Police-Citizen Encounters That Lead to Citizen
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of identity performance, 160 Hudson begins by noting that most social
interaction of all types occurs without conflict.161 Nonetheless, each side has
the goal of controlling the interaction so as to get the other party to respond
to them in a desired way. 162 This is, therefore, a process of identity
negotiation wherein each side wants the other to attribute to them the
identity they are seeking to convey.
Hudson's analysis is consistent with my assertion that police
officers often use stops and frisks as a means of staging, and winning,
masculinity contests. According to Hudson, the policeman's masculinity is
always at stake because the job itself places a "high premium on
masculinity.... 163 Likewise, civilian complaints are most likely when the
civilian's masculine esteem is at stake. Two situations in which civilians are
most likely to complain involve special threats to their masculinity. One is
when the civilian is in his home: here, the idea that "a man's home is his
castle" leads to the conclusion that a civilian becomes emasculated when he
loses control of the interaction in his home.164 Another situation is when the
civilian is threatened by an officer in front of his family; losing control in
front of the household of which he considers himself the head produces the
feeling of emasculation. 165 Hudson thus sees the street encounter between
officer and civilian as a sort of masculinity contest in which each side has
the incentive to try and impose his will on the other.'
66
160 On identity performance theory in law, see, for example, Angela Onwuachi-
Willig & Mario Bames, By Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded As " Black, and Why
Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1283
(discussing identity performance issues involved in employment discrimination based on
applicant's name); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006) (explicating processes of forced assimilation wherein individuals "cover" or hide their
denigrated social characteristics).




165 Id. at 184 (identifying the presence of family as a factor); id. at 189 (identifying
the presence of significant other as a factor).
166 See id. at 180 (utilizing Goffman's theory to describe the encounter); see also
Martin, supra note 119, at 117 (citation omitted) ("Citizens generally defer to police, but in
some instances they may seek to disrupt normal interaction by disavowing the officer's
police identity and relate person to person by refocusing the interaction on irrelevant
statuses, such as age, race, ethnicity, or gender, to gain an advantage.").
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In a more recent article, Martin agrees with this framing of the male
police officer against male civilian encounter as a masculinity contest. As
Martin says, "Rejection of a male citizen's effort to be treated as a man may
result in a 'duel of manhood,' which has a high probability of a verbal or
physical confrontation since the man who backs down first fails the test of
masculinity. 167 It is helpful to note that male police officer against male
civilian encounters start from the premise that the officer is "the man."'
' 68
Because that assertion is a challenge to the civilian's esteem, some civilian
men may try to reassert their masculinity against the officer. According to
Martin, the officer may then seek to reassert his authority:
When young male "street dudes" bait or challenge a male officer,
the officer may manage his own reaction by drawing on his age
superiority and treating the challenger as too young to merit a
response. Alternatively, he may dispense so called street justice,
reflecting a failure to maintain emotional self-control but
displaying police authority. 1
69
Here, then, we are presented with the situation imagined in the
Terry Court's explanation for why stops and frisks are not always aimed at
evidence-gathering. 70 If the Terry Court understood its description of
"maintain[ing] the power image of the beat officer ' 7 1 to refer to what
Martin calls the dispensing of "street justice," then the Court understood the
encounter as a sort of masculinity contest. The Terry decision empowers
police officers to reestablish their position as "the man" in that contest. In
the process, officers emasculate suspects and elevate their own masculine
esteem. The next Part more fully applies the concept of masculinity contests
to the language of the Terry opinion.
167 Martin, supra note 119, at 118 (internal citations omitted).
161Id. at 117-18.
169 Id. at 118 (internal citations omitted).
170 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.1 1 (1968) (explaining that officers may




Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
II. APPLYING MASCULINITIES STUDIES TO
TERRY STOPS AND FRISKS
Having critically reviewed the field of masculinities studies and
developed an original theory of the hegemonic pattern of police officer
masculinity, this Part demonstrates the theory's utility by applying it to the
field of criminal procedure. Specifically, it asks whether the Terry stop and
frisk doctrine is subject to a new reading, using the lens of masculinities
studies.
This reading of the stop and frisk doctrine seeks to uncover
assumptions about police officer manhood in the Terry decision that are
consistent with the hegemonic patterns of U.S. masculinity in general, and
police officer masculinity in particular. This Part argues that the Court's
statement about "the power image of the beat officer" reflects the
homosociality, anxiety, dominance-seeking, denigration of contrast figures,
culture of honor stance, emphasis on command presence, punishment of
disrespect, and allowance of masculinity contests that Part I described as
aspects of U.S. masculinity in general and police officer masculinity in
particular. Specifically, the Terry Court's language suggests that it believes
it is inevitable that police officers will use their stop and frisk powers to
establish who is "the man" on the street. Further, the Court's belief in this
inevitability is consistent with the late 1960s consensus on the police.
Deciding to allow officers to maintain their power image via stops and
frisks was also consistent with an emerging call for law and order. This Part
argues that we should take an intersectional approach to analyzing racial
profiling. Thus it provides three examples of contemporary police use of
Terry stops and frisks to bully civilians and shows how each example,
though taken from the literature criticizing racial profiling, also contains a
masculinity contest.
A. How the Terry Decision Accepts the Hegemonic Pattern of Police
Officer Masculinity
In this Part, I argue that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio makes
assumptions about police officers that lead to the creation of a harassment-
friendly doctrine. Specifically, the Court accepts the assumptions behind the
hegemonic patterns of U.S. and police officer masculinities as givens.
1. What Happened in the Terry Case
In the Terry decision, the Court considered a situation in which an
experienced white police officer, McFadden, found that "his attention was
702 [Vol. 18:3
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attracted" by two black men, Terry and Chilton.172 The race of the suspects,
though unmentioned in the opinion, was significant to their attraction of
McFadden's attention. 173 In McFadden's narrative, Terry and Chilton took
turns looking into a store window and then conversed with each other., 74 A
white man, Katz, approached Terry and Chilton; the parties exchanged
words and then Katz walked away.17 5 Terry and Chilton then "resumed their
measured pacing, peering, and conferring" and eventually headed in the
direction Katz had taken. 76 At the eventual suppression hearing, McFadden
stated that at this point, he believed the men were conspiring to rob the store
they had been observing. 77 He also stated he believed the men might be
armed. 1
78
McFadden followed Terry and Chilton and caught up with them as
they were conferring with Katz. 179 After trying to get the men to identify
themselves, McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted the
outside of his clothing in search of weapons. 180 Feeling a pistol, McFadden
tried to remove it, but could not do so, and ushered the three suspects into a
172 Id. at 5.
173 See Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect," supra note 15, at 141 n.3 (highlighting the
way a "Statement of the Facts" articulates the meaning of the underlying elements of the
story); see also John Q. Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of
Police Stops and Frisks Based on Less Than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES 295, 302-03 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (discussing how race was raised at oral
argument but not discussed by the Court thereafter); Thompson, supra note 15, at 963-68
(criticizing the Terry Court's refusal to acknowledge race of parties). As Devon Carbado has
noted with respect to later criminal procedure opinions, the Court's color-blindness masks a
racial ideology. See Carbado, supra note 53, at 967 ("[T]he Court both constructs race (that
is, produces a particular conception of what race is) and reifies race (that is, conceptualizes
race as existing completely outside of or apart from the very legal frameworks within which
the Court produces it.") (footnote omitted)).
174 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
175 Id. The Terry opinion refuses to acknowledge Katz's race. See Thompson supra
note 15, at 963-68 (criticizing the opinion's deracialization of the facts).





0 Id. at 7.
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store. 18' There, he retrieved Terry's pistol, patted down Chilton and
retrieved a weapon, and patted down Katz and found no weapon.
82
Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed
weapons. 83 They moved to suppress the guns as products of illegal seizures
and searches.1 84 The trial court denied the motions. It did not believe that
McFadden had the requisite probable cause to justify an arrest and full-
blown search.1 85 The issue, therefore, was whether probable cause was
required to justify McFadden's actions.' 86 New York already had a statute
allowing stops and frisks on less than probable cause. There were other
judicial and scholarly authorities in support of a lowered standard. 187 The
Terry trial court followed those authorities and distinguished between an
arrest and a "stop," and between a full-blown search and a "frisk."1 88 It
found that McFadden could make the stop because, on the basis of his
experience, he had "reasonable cause to believe . . . some interrogation
should be made.... ,,189 McFadden could frisk the outer surfaces of Terry
and Chiltons' clothing based on his reasonable cause to believe that they
were armed.' 90 The trial court then convicted Terry and Chilton, who
appealed unsuccessfully until the Terry case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court.
19 1
In the first section of the opinion, the Terry Court takes





185 Id. at 7-8.
186 The Court initially thought so, as Warren's draft opinion held that probable
cause was required and that McFadden's information passed that threshold. See Barrett,
supra note 173, at 304 (describing draft opinion as requiring probable cause for stops and
frisks).
187 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 n.3 (citing authorities).
188 Id. at 8.
189 Id.
191 Id. As the Court notes, Chilton died before the case reached the Court.
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disallowed on the grounds that they are often used for harassment. That is
the section of the opinion that exhibits the Court's concern with allowing
police officers to express their masculinity. I will turn to that section of the
opinion below, but first I will briefly describe how the Terry Court decided
the case.
In the second section of its opinion, the Terry Court turned to the
question of what degree of justification officers must show in order to stop
or frisk. In short, the Court held that stops and frisks only require
reasonable suspicion rather than the more traditional and more stringent
probable cause standard. 192 The Court derived a new "reasonable suspicion"
test from a "reasonable person" standard. It said that "the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion."' 93 As I have noted elsewhere, the Court comes to that conclusion
by adopting a "scope continuum" approach to the Fourth Amendment: "In
our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment
governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to
make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of
the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness."', 94 Police
intrusions on privacy that are of significant scope, such as arrests and full-
blown searches, will continue to require probable cause. Stops and frisks,
because they are of limited scope, will only be tested for reasonable
suspicion. 195
With its new standard in hand, the Court determines that McFadden
had reasonable suspicion to stop Terry and his compatriots because their
furtive actions suggested they were casing the store for a robbery.196
McFadden could frisk the men because it is reasonable to suspect that men
who are planning a daylight robbery would be armed. 197 Ultimately, the
Terry Court makes it very easy to conduct legitimate stops and frisks. It
only does so, though, after a tortured debate in the first section of the
opinion over whether all stop and frisk evidence not based on probable
192 Id. at 20 (rejecting probable cause requirement).
193 Id. at 21.
194 Cooper, Cultural Context Matters, supra note 52, at 854 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968)).
195 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (contrasting scope of intrusions in arrests and stops).
'96 Id. at 22-23 (justifying McFadden's determination to make a stop).
97 Id. at 28.
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cause had to be excluded because of the existence of illegitimate uses of
stops and frisks.
The first substantive part of the Terry opinion begins by claiming
that the Court will canvas "the practical and constitutional arguments
pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power
of the police to 'stop and frisk."",198 The first section of the opinion appears
to deal with the practical side of the arguments. According to the Court, the
police argue that "dangerous situations on city streets" require allowing the
"minor inconvenience" of a stop and frisk at the discretion of the police
officer.1 99 In contrast, the civil libertarians argue that we must stick to "the
traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment" 200 because unfettered
police discretion will lead to police officers bullying minorities.
20 1
The Court converts that general debate about whether stops and
frisks are necessary tools or steps toward widespread police harassment into
a debate over whether the exclusionary rule is ever appropriately used to
prevent police harassment. The exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from
admitting unconstitutionally seized evidence during its case-in-chief.20 2 The
Terry Court begins its exclusionary rule analysis by describing the rule's
primary function as the deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct.
20 3
The idea is to remove the incentive to engage in such conduct that would be
provided if the evidence could be used in a prosecution.20 4 The Court starts
its Terry analysis, however, from the premise that it is always inappropriate
to exclude evidence gained from legitimate police investigation as a means
of deterring very similar conduct that is constitutionally illegitimate.20 5 So
the fact that police sometimes use stops and frisks to bully minorities does
not justify setting a high standard for the use of stops and frisks. That
premise forecloses utilizing the exclusionary rule's deterrence function as
an indirect weapon against conduct that is admittedly undesirable.
198Id. at 10.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 11.
201 Id. at 11-12.
202 Id. at 12 (describing the exclusionary rule's primary function).
203 Id. (describing how the exclusionary rule operates).
204 id.
205 Id. at 13.
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Next, the Court argues that the exclusionary rule is not always
effective as a deterrent. That is the case because "[e]ncounters are initiated
by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly
unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime., 20 6 In a footnote, the Court lists
four such purposes. First, the police might initiate an encounter for the
purpose of guiding a drunk home, and do so "with no intention of arresting
him unless he becomes obstreperous. 2 7 Second, the police may wish to
"mediate a domestic quarrel that threatens to erupt into violence. 20 8 Third,
police might force "a woman in an area known for prostitution" to leave as
"part of a harassment campaign designed to drive prostitutes away without
the considerable difficulty involved in prosecuting them., 20 9 Finally, police
may conduct "a dragnet search of all teenagers in a particular section of the
city for weapons because they have heard rumors of an impending gang
fight. 2 10 The Court's argument seems to be that some of the uses for stops
and frisks that are not aimed at prosecution are ones we would not wish to
deter.
Having noted the variety of purposes for stops and frisks, the Court
turns to the argument that stops and frisks are sometimes used to harass
minorities. It admits that "[d]oubtless some [stop and frisk] conduct violates
the Fourth Amendment," but contends that those incidents are
undeterrable. 211 The exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter invasions of
constitutionally protected rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal. 21 2 What might that other goal be? Here the Court
refers to the "wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, especially Negroes, frequently
complain ... ,,213 In other words, the exclusionary rule cannot deter the use
206 Id.
207 Id. at 13 n.9.
208 Id. at 14 n.9.
209 Id. at 14.
210 id.
211 Id. at 13-14.
212 Id. at 14.
213 Id.
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of stops and frisks to violate constitutional rights where police have the goal
of harassing blacks without any intent to prosecute them.214
My conclusion that the Terry Court thinks police bullying of racial
minorities is undeterrable precisely because the primary motivation for the
harassment is extra-judicial is supported by a footnote the Court drops when
mentioning police harassment. In discussing the practice of "field
interrogation" (stop and frisk) the Court declares:
[I]t cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-
community tensions. This is particularly true in situations where
the "stop and frisk" of youths or minority group members is
"motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power
image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by
humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of
the streets."
215
Later, this Article will press upon that language to argue that police
officers' masculinity is at stake in the question of whether they will be able
to stop and frisk on less than probable cause. For now, it suffices to point
out that the Terry Court's "power image" footnote explicitly links stop and
frisks to the harassment of blacks without the purpose of furthering
prosecution for crime. Specifically, these stops and frisks are motivated by
the desire to maintain a power image on the streets. While such bullying
seems to be part of the activity that the Court identified as "violative of the
Fourth Amendment,, 216 it also seems to be the very activity the Court
believes is undeterrable. If the police will maintain their power image
regardless of whether they can prosecute, goes the argument, harassment
will occur even if the exclusionary rule is applied. For the Court, the
undeterrable nature of this harassment makes it an inappropriate ground for
excluding evidence gained from stops and frisks that were aimed at
prosecution.217
214 That analysis avoids, and maybe even begs, the question of whether officers
with the mixed motive of both harassing racial minorities and prosecuting anyone upon
whom they find evidence ought to be able to keep the evidence.
211 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 n. 11 (quoting TIFFANY ETAL., supra note 27, at 47-48)
(emphasis added).
211d. at 14.
217 That conclusion is a twist on the Court's premise that the existence of
illegitimate uses of stops and frisks could never justify barring otherwise legitimate stops and
frisks, which this Article mentioned earlier.
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2. The Terry Court's Language as Endorsing Masculinity Contests
The Terry Court's argument that harassment is undeterrable tacitly
endorses stops and frisks "'motivated by the officers' perceived need to
maintain the power image of the beat officer'"218-particularly when we
read the opinion in light of masculinities studies. One reason the Court
makes it easy for police officers to stop and frisk civilians is that it accepts
the principles of the hegemonic patterns of U.S. and police officer
masculinities. While I cannot prove that the Court thought in this way, I
suggest that the Justices' reasoning had the effect of accepting and
reinforcing the hegemonic patterns of U.S. and police officer masculinity.
This subsection traces the ways in which the Terry opinion accepts the
assumptions of the hegemonic patterns of U.S. masculinity, in general and
police officer masculinity in particular.
First, as to the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity in general, it
is important to remember that the Terry Court was implicitly aware of the
homosocial nature of the police-civilian interaction. The Court was surely
aware that in 1968 nearly all police officers were men. A consciousness of
who came before the Court in criminal cases would have also made it aware
of the fact that the police mostly stopped men. The Court thus had
background knowledge that any rule it set down would govern relations
between men.
A second way in which the Court acted in accordance with the
assumptions of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity is that it seemed
aware that police have the sort of masculine anxiety I described in Part I.A.
This is seen in the Court's recognitions that policemen have a perceived
"need" to maintain their power image.219 This may be a tacit
acknowledgement that policemen harbor a fear of having their authority,
and thus their manhood, undermined. 220 As I noted earlier, policemen's
punishment of disrespect is rooted in masculine anxiety. 221 The Court's
assumption that police officers need to maintain their power image seems to
accept that anxiety about one's authority is a part of manhood.
A third way in which the Court accepted that police officers will act
consistently with the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity is by assuming
218 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.l 1 (1968) (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra
note 27, at 47-48).
219 Id. at 14 n.il.
220 See discussion supra Part I.B (linking policemen's authority to their manhood).
221 See id. (explaining why police punish disrespect).
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that police officers are engaged in a competition with suspects for control of
the streets. The Court made reference to the "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. 222 The Court seemed to accept that police officers see
themselves as involved in a competition when it framed the opinion with
the police's argument that "in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often
dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating
set of flexible responses., 223 The police seem to be arguing that there are
new types of criminality, perhaps what Justice Douglas calls "new forms of
lawlessness," and that the Court must therefore grant the police a new tool
224in order to make the competition between police and suspects fair. Since
the Court goes beyond merely acknowledging that police and suspects are
in competition with one another by accepting that the police will
"humiliate" anyone who challenges their authority, 225 it seems to accept
hegemonic masculinity's assumption that men are in a competition wherein
they seek to dominate one another.
226
A final way in which the Court's reasoning is consistent with the
hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity is in its assumption that at least some
officers would harass racial minorities even if they would thereby lose any
evidence so gained.2 27 This is consistent with the hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity's directive to denigrate contrast figures. At the time of Terry,
mostly white male police forces spent much of their time pursuing men
from racial minority groups.2 28 Given that the NAACP put the Court on
notice that police officers often harass blacks, the Court's refusal to provide
an effective deterrent to that conduct suggests that it viewed denigration of
222 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948)).
21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (contrasting police contention with NAACP argument).
224 Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for watering down the
Fourth Amendment).
225 Id. at 14 n.l 1 (describing use of stops and frisks to harass).
226 See supra Part I.A. (defining qualities of hegemonic pattern of U.S.
masculinity).
221 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (contending that the exclusionary rule cannot deter
police harassment).
228 See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense
of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210




contrast figures to be inevitable. 229 Therefore, the Terry Court likely viewed
police racial harassment as inevitable, because the alternative conclusion
would be that it saw racial harassment as actually desirable.
Furthermore, the Terry Court's seeming acceptance of the police
response of humiliating anyone who challenges them also accepts the
"culture of honor" stance. As Harris has noted, officers punish disrespect
because they interpret any disrespect of their authority as a threat of a
general breakdown of law and order.230 The Terry Court's acceptance of
police humiliation of civilians who challenge police authority suggests that
it accepted the culture of honor stance as natural. This makes sense given
that Supreme Court Justices are a product of the very culture they are to
oversee, 23 and late 1960s culture retained significant traces of cultures of
honor.232
While the Terry Court did not seem to accept police
hypermasculinity as a necessary manifestation of the hegemonic pattern of
U.S. masculinity, the overall effect of the opinion is to allow policemen to
act in a "manly" fashion. Allowing officers to "humiliate" those who
challenge their authority still treats the police-civilian encounter as a
competition that men will inevitably try to dominate. This Article does not
argue that the Court necessarily accepted hypermasculinity, but it does
argue that allowance of police bullying is not inconsistent with
hypermasculinity.
Whereas the Terry Court's adoption of the perspective of the
hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity is epitomized by its view of the
police-civilian encounter as a competition, its adoption of the perspective of
the hegemonic pattern of police officer masculinity is epitomized by its
acceptance of police aggression. While the Court was unaware of the theory
of command presence, it was aware that police officers feel the need to
229 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11-12 (acknowledging that the NAACP was alleging
racial harassment by the police).
230 See Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 798 ("Abner Louima was a direct
threat to the masculinity of the officer he was thought to have assaulted; by extension, he
was a threat to the masculinity of the officers in Volpe's unit and to the masculinity of New
York's finest as a whole.").
231 See Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect," supra note 15, at 150 (arguing that the
change in predominant beliefs explains the shift from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 567
(1896) (upholding racial segregation) to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(striking down racial segregation in public primary and secondary schools)).
232 See Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 790 & n.47 (describing
contemporary homicide doctrines as products of our culture of honor).
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maintain their "power image. 2 33 Accepting that police officers need to
dominate the streets goes beyond merely validating the police need to
control dangerous suspects, which is the justification for command
presence. By accepting the idea that police will "humiliate" those who
merely challenge police authority, the Court tacitly endorsed preemptive
strikes on those people.234 The theory here seems to be that certain groups-
young racial minority males-are likely to produce criminals, and may
therefore be controlled through command presence in advance of their
actual commission of a crime. Such preemptive strikes through the
enactment of command presence are most likely to occur when civilians
disrespect police officers. The Terry Court seemed to understand this, as it
suggested that officers will "humiliat[e]" anyone who seeks to "undermine
police control of the streets." 235 So the Court acknowledged that stops and
frisks are a tool that officers use to enact a command presence and punish
disrespect.
The way in which the Terry Court endorsed the enactment of
command presence in order to punish disrespect also allows the police to
express their masculinity through the initiation of masculinity contests. The
Court acknowledged that the police may initiate stops and frisks for the
purpose of maintaining their power image.6 In contemporary language, the
Court acknowledged that police officers sometimes initiate stops and frisks
just to show certain communities who is "the man." As I noted, stops and
frisks create a masculinity challenge for both the suspect and the officer.237
Both parties will respond to the challenge by seeking to impose their will on
the other.238 The Terry decision empowers the officer to dominate an
encounter by allowing him to stop, and usually frisk, the civilian any time
he has an articulable suspicion of crime. 39 Since the Terry Court
acknowledged that police may choose to stop and frisk civilians just to
show who is "the man," it effectively allows officers to use stops and frisks
233 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.1 1 (quoting TIFFANY ETAL., supra note 27, at 47-48).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 14-15 n. 1I (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 27, at 47-48).
236 Id. at 14 n. I1 (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 27, at 47-48).
237 See supra Part I.C (defining masculinity contests).
238 See id. (describing masculinity contests).




to boost their masculine esteem. This is consistent with my theory of
masculinity contests. Specifically, the Court presumed it to be inevitable
that police officers will initiate masculinity contests aimed more at boosting
their masculine esteem than at uncovering crime. To further demonstrate
the utility of applying masculinities studies to criminal procedure, it will be
necessary to explain why the Court implicitly endorsed police initiation of
masculinity contests. I turn to that task in the next subsection.
3. Why the Terry Court Accepted Police Initiation of Masculinity
Contests
When deciding whether to try to deter police from "humiliating"
anyone who disrespected them, the Terry Court implicitly faced this
problem: anytime a civilian is doing something an officer finds suspicious
or inappropriate within that officer's patrol area, the civilian is implicitly
challenging that officer's authority. 240 We might even say the civilian's
disrespect for the officer's authority challenges the officer's manhood. The
civilian's provocative behavior is thus likely to result in what the Terry
Court called an "encounter" between the officer and the citizen.24' At the
time of the Terry opinion, officers surely had the right to approach such a
person and seek to initiate a consensual encounter.242 So, the officer could
say, "Hold it, I'd like to ask you some questions about why you're in this
area." But what if "None of your business!" were the civilian's reply? It
was already clear that the officer had the power to arrest such a person if he
had probable cause to believe a crime was afoot and this person was
involved.24 3 If the officer lacked probable cause, he would have to say
something like, "Never mind, do whatever you like." That would cause the
officer to lose face in what the Terry Court thought were "often
244competitive" relations between police and potential suspects . As SusanEstrich has noted in the rape context, courts often model confrontations
240 Id. at 14 n. 1I (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 27, at 47-48).
241 Id. at 13. As my former colleague Len Packel often noted, the Terry Court
introduced the concept of an "encounter" in this opinion.
242 Id. at 19 n. 16 (noting that some police-citizen interactions do not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny). See also id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (noting policeman's right to
address questions on the street).
243 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (framing issue as whether evidence short of probable
cause ought to allow seizure and search).
244 See id. at 12 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
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between men on a "boys' fight" in the playground.245 A boy would not be
expected to back down from such a confrontation because that would make
him a "sissy., 246 So, if the Terry Court had not created reasonable suspicion
doctrine, an entire rubric of encounters would have required officers to
respond in an unmanly way.247 After Terry, an officer who had been
challenged and who had only reasonable suspicion a crime was afoot could
grab the suspect, throw him against a wall, 248 spread his legs, and roughly
pat down his groin.249 It would be clear who was "the man."
i. The 1960s Consensus on the Police
Was the Terry Court aware that it was allowing police officers to
play a game of "who's the man?" Perhaps implicitly. This Article does not
claim to prove that assumptions about masculinity were a direct cause of the
Terry opinion, only that masculinities studies "can help to explain the
ruling, by making more understandable" certain presumptions that are
consistent with the opinion. 25 Note the fact that 1960s scholarship on
245 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986) (analogizing courts'
treatment of the resistance requirement, and of criminal law generally, to typical
understanding of what boys do in schoolyards).
246 See generally id. (analyzing the playground metaphor for some of rape
doctrine's assumptions).
247 1 am aware that the Court has sometimes suggested that one may walk away
from a Terry stop. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (contending "the
person stopped is not obliged to answer"). Even though the suspect need not answer
questions, he may be "restrained briefly in the process." Id. One's right to walk away from a
Terry stop is limited by the fact that the officer will usually have a right to frisk the person
first. Regardless, the Court recently repudiated the idea that you need not cooperate with a
Terry stop, at least when a state statute requires you to identify yourself. See Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (upholding arrest for refusing to identify self
during stop).
141 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 (noting suspect may be "facing a wall with his hands
raised").
249 Such a frisk may include sensitive palpitation of the area about the groin. Id. at
17 n.13 (describing frisk). The potential homoeroticism of this practice should be obvious.
As Richard Myers reminds me, police holding only reasonable suspicion in fact often
conduct "full blown" searches and then sort out the details later. See. e.g,, Jon B. Gould &
Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the US.
Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 316, (2004) (describing anal search on, at best,
mere reasonable suspicion).
250 David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1728
(2005) [hereinafter Sklansky, Police and Democracy].
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policing described officers as overly concerned with proving their
masculinity.25' The Justices were part of the intelligentsia that had reached
that conclusion about the police.25 2 As political scientist Robert Dahl put it,
"it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that
a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court
Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds
with the rest of the political elite. ' 253 Simultaneously, the Justices were part
of the status quo that must have felt threatened by the crisis of masculinity
of the late 1960s. As historian Michael Flamm puts it, "[c]hanging patterns
of gender relations and family structure, which eroded traditional forms of
patriarchy and authority, also created sources of tension for many [United
States citizens], particularly white males. 254 The hegemony of the middle-
class white male model was also under attack from the black civil rights
movement, among other fronts.255 At least at the subconscious level, then,
the Terry Court may have been aware that police officers considered their
manhood to be at stake in the debate over whether they could stop and frisk
people on weaker grounds than probable cause.
The Terry Court's concern with the group mentality of the police,
as exemplified by its acceptance of the idea that beat officers seek to
maintain a collective power image, mirrors a concern found in the police
251 See, e.g., id. at 1705, 1734 (quoting JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33-34, 47 (1968)
[hereinafter WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR]).
252 See id. at 1734.
253 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957), quoted in Sklansky, Police and
Democracy, supra note 250, at 1739. Elsewhere I have argued that a cultural trend can
influence law and that law can then reciprocally reinforce that trend. See Cooper, The
"Seesaw Effect," supra note 15, at 140 (calling for critical cultural theory methodology
focusing on "how the particular meanings of identities are socially constructed at a given
moment and then create slippages between how courts imagine doctrines and how they are
applied in practice"). Here, a perceived crisis of masculinity in culture helps explain why the
Court would reinforce hegemonic patterns of masculinities with its declaration that police
must be allowed to protect "the power image of the beat officer." Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15
n. 11 (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 27, at 47-48).
254 See MICHAEL FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s 7 (2005).
255 Traister says of the 1960s that "middle-class straight (and now gay) [U.S.] men
faced yet a new crisis, this time the threat of second-wave feminism, black activism, civil
rights, and the uncertainties of authority born of the Vietnam war." Traister, supra note 54, at
288.
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studies scholarship of the period. For example, in his article, Police and
Democracy, David Alan Sklansky considers the relationship between
theories of democracy and the ways the Court thinks about the police. In
surveying both humanities scholarship on the police and criminal procedure
cases during the Warren Court era, Sklansky determines that an
understanding of the police as having a group psychology, worries about
how the police use their discretion, and a belief that judicial oversight of the
police was necessary were hallmarks of the times.25 6 Sklansky concludes
that the 1960s saw the development of an understanding of the police as
having a distinctive mentality, one marked by cultural conservatism,
hostility to difference, and the potential for violence. 7 He does not argue
that this view appears explicitly in Warren Court jurisprudence but does
believe it subtly influences decisions.258  According to the 1960s
scholarship, the police were united as a group by the fact that their job
isolated them from the rest of the community.259 This caused them to create
distinctive norms. 260 Even reactionary political scientist James Q. Wilson,
who would later rationalize aggressive policing on grounds that blacks were
genetically predisposed to be criminals, 261 believed that police officers'
262working-class backgrounds led them to view violence as legitimate.
Unfortunately, the picture of 1960s police officers as aggressive is
consistent with the contemporary hegemonic pattern of police officer
masculinity that I identified in Part I.B.
256 Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 250, at 1705, 1731.
257 Id. at 1733. One early 1970s article does challenge (not especially
convincingly) the prevailing view that the police had a group mentality. Robert Balch, The
Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?, 63 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 106 (1972).
258 Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 250, at 1733.
59Id. at 1732.
260 Id.
261 See Thomas L. Dumm, The New Enclosures: Racism in the Normalized
Community, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 178, 182 (Robert
Gooding Williams ed., 1993) (critiquing JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN, CRIME
AND HUMAN NATURE: THE DEFINITIVE STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF CRIME (1998)). If this
Article has one quibble with Sklansky over his Police and Democracy article, it is that he
accepts the authority of Wilson's scholarship while never explicitly mentioning its basis in
racist conceptions of human nature.
262 Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 250, at 1733.
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Specifically, the 1960s view of police is consistent with their
engagement in masculinity contests of the type I identify above. As
Sklansky notes, the Warren Court was fond of referring to "the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime., 263 Scholars such as Wilson
argued that police officers of the 1960s were preoccupied with "maintaining
self-respect, proving one's masculinity, 'not taking any crap,' and not being
'taken in.' 264 Here is a masculinity that is consistent with Kimmel's notion
of hegemonic masculinity as a relentless test requiring proof of one's
manhood.265 The 1960s consensus thought of officers as having a cynical
view of the world that presumed civilians were out to pull one over on
them.266 Those inherently adversarial civilians then provided officers with
an opportunity to prove their manhood by teaching civilians to show
respect. The Terry Court's assumption that it was inevitable that police
officers would seek out masculinity contests was thus implicit in the
predominant 1960s understanding of police officer mentality.
ii. The Callfor "Law and Order"
If the Terry Court was implicitly aware of those dynamics, why did
it expand police discretion rather than clamping down? Sklansky provides a
potential answer: "[A]s the 1960s wore on, social stability grew to seem
more precarious, and consensus became, correspondingly, all the more
imperative., 267 The result was a call for "law and order" to which the Court
seemed to respond with its pro-police position in the Terry decision.
At the heart of the belief that there had been a breakdown of public
order that required a strengthening of law and order was a complaint that
the U.S. Supreme Court had abandoned the mainstream's interest in
effective law enforcement in favor of the rights of criminals.268 Specifically,
conservatives argued that the Court should overturn a series of decisions
263 Id. at 1734 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
264 Id. at 1733 (quoting WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 251,
at 33-34, 47).
265 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 31.
266 Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 250, at 1733 (quoting WILSON,
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 251, at 33-34, 47).
"' -d. at 1749.
268 See FLAMM, supra note 254, at 3 (citing conservative argument that there had
been a general breakdown in public order).
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that, they contended, had hampered the police.269 One way of thinking about
the impact of the law and order discourse on the Terry Court is to think
about the Miranda decision. The complaint that Miranda had handcuffed
the police was a centerpiece of the law and order critique of the Court.270 As
John Q. Barrett has revealed, Chief Justice Warren initially wanted to write
the Terry decision as a Miranda-type set of procedures for stops and
frisks.27 1 But the rest of the Court was hesitant to go back down that path.272
While the Terry opinion displays some concern with the group mentality of
the police and how they use their discretion, it also represents a trend
towards ending the belief that police discretion could and should be
contained by judicial oversight.273As Tracey Maclin has argued in an
important essay on the Terry decision, a reasonable reading of the Court's
reluctance to limit "stop and frisk" powers is that it was a response to the
274public uproar over the Miranda decision.
This Article reinforces Maclin's view and adds the insight that the
context of the 1960s masculinity crisis may have propelled an emerging law
and order ideology. Just as the Terry decision may have been, in part, a
response to the criticism of the Miranda decision, it may also have been, in
part, a response to the ideology of law and order. As the ideology of law
and order gained popularity, it influenced political actors such as the
Court.
2 75 The call for law and order was, in part, a response to the 1960s
269 See id. (describing the conservatives' positive program).
270 See id. at 55 (describing conservative criticism of Miranda decision).
271 See Barrett, supra note 173, at 304 (describing Court's process of writing the
Terry decision).
272 Id.
273 Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271, 1285 (1998) (declaring that, unlike in the
past, in Terry, racial concerns "clearly occupied a subordinate position to the Court's
overriding concern about police safety and violent crime").
274 See id. at 1287 (concluding that "the Terry Court succumbed to pressure to
weaken constitutional principle when it was clear that many politicians, and a large segment
of the public, had signaled their disapproval of the Court's effort to extend meaningful
constitutional protection to those who needed it the most: poor and minority persons
suspected of criminal behavior").
275 The Court is a political actor, at least in the broad sense of the term. See Dahl,
supra note 253, at 291 (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court justices are part of a broad political
consensus amongst the intelligentsia).
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crisis of masculinity. As hegemonic manhood seemed to be under attack,
conservatives called for it to be shored up. Letting police officers be "the
man" on the street was consistent with law and order thinking. The Terry
Court seems to have succumbed to that thinking.
4. Why Blame the Terry Decision for Masculinity Contests?
Before concluding my discussion on how the Terry Court accepted
the hegemonic patterns of U.S. and police officer masculinity, it will be
helpful to pause and address a potential objection. Some commentators
might say that the Terry decision does not expand police officer discretion
and therefore does not cause an increase in police harassment. These
readers would insist that since police officers were already conducting stops
and frisks prior to the Terry decision, the Supreme Court did not change the
status quo.276 In my view, this argument is not persuasive: by providing its
stamp of approval for stops and frisks, the Terry Court expanded police
discretion by insulating the practice from legal challenge. Before the Terry
decision, police who stopped and frisked civilians without probable cause
were taking a calculated risk that they might lose any evidence they found.
After the Terry decision, officers knew for sure that they had the discretion
to stop and frisk civilians upon mere reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, the Terry decision's expansion of police officer
discretion increases opportunities for harassment. It creates a huge category
of police activity that takes place absent significant judicial oversight.
After-the-fact evaluations of stops and frisks are hampered by the inherent
vagueness of the reasonable suspicion standard.277 The consequence of the
lack of judicial oversight is that stops and frisks can very easily mask
illegitimate harassment. The low standard means that police may intrude
upon a wider range of suspects at an earlier point in the investigation.2 78 The
officer can have it both ways by conducting stops and frisks upon both
those whom he reasonably suspects of crime and those whom he wishes to
harass. Whenever no evidence is found, the stop is invisible to the courts
276 See Barrett, supra note 173, at 299 (noting use of stops and frisks to search
Italians in New York City prior to the Terry decision).
277 See Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect," supra note 15, at 143 (arguing Court's
approach to Fourth Amendment in the Terry decision enlarges the number of people police
officers may stop).
278 See Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment, supra note 52, at 885 ("The
very terminology of the reasonable suspicion doctrine, therefore, prevents meaningful review
of an officer's decision to stop or frisk a suspect.").
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because there is no motion to suppress. Because of the Terry decision's
creation of the reasonable suspicion standard, when evidence is found in a
harassment-oriented stop, the police will often be able to keep the evidence.
The higher probable cause requirement would have limited the practice of
having it both ways. This was largely negated by Terry. After the Terry
Court's creation of the reasonable suspicion requirement, there is an arena
within which the officer can bully civilians based upon an "articulable"
suspicion and still keep any evidence he finds. Considering that the
hegemonic pattern of police officer masculinity may create an incentive for
officers to use this free harassment zone to boost their masculine esteem,
we ought to be concerned about the fact that the Terry opinion reveals a
presumption that bullying is inevitable.
B. Contemporary Manifestations of Police Bullying
Having demonstrated the utility of masculinities studies for helping
us better understand a seminal case, this Article presses for the widespread
usage of masculinities-based interpretations of criminal procedure by
identifying a current problem that cannot fully be analyzed otherwise. In
this subsection, I provide three examples in which police officers bully
civilians whom they perceive to have disrespected them or challenged their
authority. Such bullying is consistent with the theory of masculinity
contests that I developed earlier.279 While there are more egregious abuses
of the stop and frisk power than the ones I detail,28° the examples chosen
have the advantage of demonstrating the potential for harassment inherent
in stops and frisks that are otherwise typical. In addition, each of these
examples is taken from the literature criticizing the incidence of racial
profiling in isolation of issues related to masculinity and gender.
Accordingly, they aptly demonstrate the need for a theory of the
intersectionality of race and gender in criminal procedure.
279 See discussion supra Part I.C (developing theory of masculinity contests).
280 See generally Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 249 (analyzing police officer's
sexual assault on civilian during search); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional
Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 363 (2004)
(noting the "dirty hands" problem of researcher's mere observation of police officer's sexual




According to the New York State Attorney General's report on
NYPD stop and frisk practices, 28 1 Edward Stevens, a black professor from
the Virgin Islands, was Terry-stopped by an officer while driving his
Mercedes-Benz. The officer did not tell Stevens why he had pulled him
over but did question who owned the car.282 After several minutes passed,
Stevens identified himself as a professor who had to return to his school to
teach a class.283 The officer told Stevens not to rush him. 284 Twenty minutes
passed.28 5 Stevens then told the officer he needed to call his school to tell
them he would be late.286 The officer, visibly agitated, ordered Stevens out
of his car, ordered him to place his hands on the car, frisked him, and said
he had "no right to question a police officer., 287 The officer then handcuffed
Stevens, took him to the police station, refused to let him call his school,
and placed him in a jail cell.2 8 When, upon his release, Stevens asked for
documentation to justify his absence, the officer issued him a desk
appearance ticket for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and minor
infractions, none of which were traffic violations.2 89 In this example, the
Terry-stop may have been motivated by a perceived traffic violation (or just
by racial bias), but the Terry-frisk and subsequent arrest were clearly mere
punishments for questioning the officer's authority rather than responses to
danger.
Nor is Professor Stevens alone in being punished for perceived
disrespect. In June 2000, Black Enterprise reported another instance of
police bullying when Washington, D.C. attorney Robert Wilkins, who is
black, was Terry-stopped while driving home from a funeral with his
281 SPITZER, supra note 17, at 80.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 80-81.
284 Id. at 81.
285 Id.
286 Id.
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family.290 The officer alleged that Wilkins was speeding and demanded to
search the car.29' Wilkins identified himself as an attorney and objected to
the search. The officer's response was to call for a drug-sniffing dog and to
pull the whole family out of the car in the rain while officers walked the
dog around the car.292 In this example, the Terry-stop had occurred and the
dog sniff, akin to a Terry-frisk, was added on to punish Wilkins for not
"consenting" to a full blown search. 93
A third example of police officers punishing civilians for perceived
disrespect is provided by David Harris's ACLU report on racial profiling.294
Police officers Terry-stopped the Deputy President of the Connecticut
Senate, who is black, as he drove through a white area.295 The officer asked
the civilian if he knew what town he was in.296 The civilian asked both why
he was pulled over and why it mattered what town he was in.297 The officer
said he did not have to give a reason for stopping the civilian, and if the
290 Joyce Jones & Eric L. Smith, Policing the Police, BLACK ENT., June 2000, at
38.
291 Id.
292 Id. The officer obviously considered the initial intrusion to be a stop rather than
an arrest, for a valid arrest would have entitled him to a full-blown search of both Wilkins
and his car. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing full-blown search
incident to arrest without further justification for the intrusion). But see Arizona v. Gant 129
S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (limiting search incident to arrest of vehicle to times when suspect has
access to the car or there is reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest could be found
therein). Although the issue had not been settled at the time, the dog sniff of the car was not
a frisk, but "nothing." According to the current Supreme Court, this was not a "search." See
generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (allowing dog sniff following Terry-stop
of car).
293 Consent doctrine says the Fourth Amendment does not apply whenever
civilians agree to the search or seizure, even if they do not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waive their rights. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(requiring no warning of right not to comply). For a criticism of this doctrine, see Carbado,
supra note 53, at 1004-25 (criticizing consent doctrine for adopting a perpetrator perspective
on the Fourth Amendment).
294 DAVID A. HARRIS, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's






civilian made an issue of it, the officer would ticket him for speeding.298
The punishment in this example was conditional; the civilian's Terry-stop
would be expanded to include a (seemingly unjustified) ticket unless he
ceased questioning the officer's authority.
The combined effect of these examples is to suggest that there is an
unwritten rule that Terry stops and frisks will be initiated or expanded if a
civilian questions police authority. Intuitively, this makes sense. People
know that contradicting a police officer is not a good idea. Many black men
have been warned that challenging an officer can get you beaten. 299 So,
these examples, while not typical of police behavior, describe a possibility
that inheres in the police-civilian encounter. In that sense, these examples
are representative.
2. A Masculinities Studies "Re-reading" of the Examples
The above examples from the literature criticizing racial profiling
beg to be read as also involving masculinity contests. In this subsection, this
Article conducts that reading with two different but related points of
emphasis. First, I read the examples as establishing that the rule of
deference to the police leads officers to initiate masculinity contests.
Second, I read the examples as establishing the intersectionality of
masculinity and race in bringing about these harassing Terry-stops.
i. The Rule of Deference to Police Officers as a Spur for Initiating
Masculinity Contests
At the outset, the officer in the first example seems to have viewed
Stevens' assertion of a need to get to his school as a masculinity challenge.
The twenty-minute delay-after the civilian's statement that he had to be
somewhere-certainly appears to be a means of punishment for rushing the
officer. The officer's visible agitation at the civilian's repeated requests to
call his school seems to explain his decision to Terry-frisk and subsequently
arrest Stevens. The incident as a whole becomes understandable in light of
the culture of honor mentality. Officers may be prone to see any action they
interpret as a challenge to their authority as also constituting a threat to their
social standing. Police officers may feel that, as in a culture of honor, if
298 id.
299 See Carbado, supra note 53, at 952-54 (2002) (describing ways black men
perform for the police); see also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes From California: Rodney
King and the Race Question, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 199, 200 (1993) (discussing "rules of
engagement of black malehood").
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they let an infraction pass, they will be subject to constant challenges. Thus,
such challenges must be met with a forceful response. Stevens' treatment
seems to reflect that type of thinking.
In the second example of stops and frisks used for harassment, the
dog sniff again seems to have been punishment for challenging the officer's
authority. It is easy to see how an officer might consider Wilkins'
identification of his profession to be an act of pulling rank. After all,
officers are more typically from working-class backgrounds and lawyers are
generally accorded greater social status.300 For Wilkins, the attorney, to
suggest that he knew the officer had no right to search his car implied not
only a disrespect for the officer's authority, but also that Wilkins had more
right to interpret the law than the officer. In so doing, Wilkins implied that
he was a more important man than the officer. In this sense, the challenge to
the officer's authority constituted a masculinity challenge. As our
consideration of the hegemonic pattern of police officer masculinity would
suggest, the officer responded to the masculinity challenge by initiating a
masculinity contest that he was guaranteed to win.
In the third example of stops and frisks used for harassment,
masculinity is significant in at least two ways. First, the civilian's challenge
of the officer's authority constituted a disrespect of his manhood because of
the connection officers often make between respect for their authority and
respect for their manhood. Second, for that reason, the officer seems to have
initiated a masculinity contest by putting the civilian in the position of
either defending his stance or backing down. Together, then, these three
examples show that police officer punishment of disrespect, which is part of
the hegemonic pattern of police officer masculinity, often leads officers to
initiate masculinity contests.
ii. The Intersectionality of Masculinity Contests
The fact that examples of racial profiling reveal a tendency for
police officers to initiate masculinity contests strengthens the contention
that there is a need for intersectionality theory in criminal procedure. In
each of the three examples, race intersects with masculinity since the
300 See Fine et al., supra note 104, at 63 ("[T]he fire and police departments in
Jersey City . . . employ a disproportionate share of white men. We began to hear these
departments as the last public sector spaces in which white working-class men could at once
exercise identities as white, working, and men.").
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civilians were pulled over for being racially out of place. 301 The initiation of
masculinity contests by the officers in these examples seems to stem from
the need to dominate other men in general and to denigrate contrast figures
in particular. 30 2 We can better understand how police use masculinity
contests to boost their masculine esteem by reviewing those two needs in
light of our examples.
First, these examples reveal the dominance-seeking desire that
emanates from the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity. As was noted in
Part I.B, punishment of disrespect is part of the hegemonic pattern of police
officer masculinity. Police officers want citizens to defer to the badge. In
each of the three examples, the civilian "disrespects" the officer, either by
rushing him, refusing his requests, or questioning his motives. Because
officers link respect for their authority to respect for their manhood, those
actions challenge the masculine esteem of the officer. The officers in these
examples thus sought to reassert their dominance by using the tools
available to them. The officer, in effect, asks, "who's the man?" So, the
initiation of masculinity contests in these examples stems not just from
racial animus, but also from the masculine need to dominate other men.
Second, the examples this Article has provided are not solely about
manhood. They also depict how the domination of other men is intertwined
with the denigration of contrast figures. A masculinity contest is sometimes
simultaneously a means of conflict along another axis of identity as well as
a means of affirming one's manhood. For example, Harris sees the type of
police harassment that was acknowledged in the Terry opinion as a product
of conflict between men with different identities. She says that "social
stratification[s] along lines of race and class separate men from one another
and engage them in relations of competition . . .. , That is, the
combination of the definition of masculinity as expressed through
domination of others and the segmentation of masculinity into different
groups through the intersectionality of identities tends towards an ongoing
conflict between different groups of men. Especially in the late 1960s, when
police forces were virtually all-male and all-white, the police were one
distinct group of men policing another distinct group of men-virtually all
301 On the concept of being racially out of place, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and
the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 248 (1983) (containing early discussion
about the relationship between race and police officers' decisions to stop suspects).
302 See supra Part L.A (defining the need to dominate other men and to denigrate
contrast figures as qualities of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity).
303 Harris, Gender, Violence, supra note 7, at 785.
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black suspects. Consequently, competition between these racially
distinguished men was unsurprising. Since one of the two groups had the
power to dominate the other, these examples show the intersectionality of
race and masculinity in producing police bullying.
Il. TEACHING THE PROPER USE OF COMMAND PRESENCE
Having identified the sources of police bullying in both culture
(Part I) and law (Part II), this Article now proposes a solution. This Part
begins by defining the problem as the way police culture leads officers to
enact command presence when it is not truly necessary. It then considers
whether we need to reform the goals of criminal justice or just the ways
police officers perform their duties. Finally, it concludes that reforming
police training is a more realistic means of addressing the problem.
Specifically, I will show that the current police training regime fails us, that
training is capable of bringing about reform, and that the new training
regime should encompass the academy, field training, and informal training.
A. The Problem
The basic problem that this Article has identified is the need for
police officers to distinguish situations requiring command presence from
those that do not. When suspects are threatening physical violence, officers
are justified in enacting a command presence. In these cases, an
authoritative tone of voice and even physical violence may be necessary to
keep the situation from becoming worse. In contrast, a situation where
someone is mouthing off to a cop just to show off to his friends does not
require command presence. It is not that person's goal to create a dangerous
situation. They may be annoying, but they do not require force. Good cops
know the difference between those situations.
30 4
Unfortunately, bad cops have the same power to enact command
presence as good cops. Consequently, the Terry Court's endorsement of
"maintain[ing] the power image of the beat officer . . . by humiliating
anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets" is too
broad.3°5 First, why should the police be able to "control the streets"? If that
term means only that the police have the authority to suppress real
304 See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD Cops: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE
POLICING (2005) (arguing for policing that respects due process).
305 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.I1 (1968) (quoting TIFFANY ET AL., supra
note 27, at 47-48).
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disturbances, I have no problem with it. But the term seems to refer to an
ability to be beyond reproach. That meaning is suggested by the Court's
acknowledgement that stops and frisks are sometimes used merely to harass
civilians.3 °6 Further, the manual from which the Court took the phrase
"control of the streets" acknowledges that a common use of stops and frisks
was to break up groups of black men simply because they were black men
and in a group.307 The Court's language thus paints a picture of harassment
for harassment's sake-that is, a use of stops and frisks to respond to
mouthing off rather than to physical threats. Bad cops would not be
unreasonable if they understood the Terry Court to have tacitly approved of
police enactment of command presence merely to stage masculinity
contests.
While it is the Terry stop and frisk doctrine that enables police
harassment, it is how police are trained, both formally and informally, that
activates that potential. In their article, "There Oughtta Be a Law Against
Bitches ": Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, Annastasia
Prokos and Irene Padavic show how women are marginalized in policing
through the incorporation of the hegemonic pattern of U.S. masculinity into
the rituals of policing.308 They describe a female cadet's experience in a
police training academy. The male cadets constantly used the phrase, "there
oughtta be a law against bitches," which they had seen a suspect say in an
episode of the television show COPS that the academy screened for training
purposes.309 That statement exemplified the training and suggests that one
of the hidden lessons of police academy training is that women are outsiders
in policing and there are no repercussions for treating them as such.310 That
message is consistent with the denigration of contrast figures, which I have
defined as integral to the hegemonic pattern of United States masculinity. In
a simple but profound sense, then, police academies teach policemen this
lesson: "Hegemonic masculinity is a central defining concept in the culture
306 Id. at 13.
307 See TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 27, at 13 ("In most instances, the officers have
no grounds for suspicion other than the facts that ... the 'suspect' is male, and that he is in
an area with a high crime rate. Such areas are predominately inhabited by minority racial
groups."); see also Maclin, supra note 273, at 1282 (arguing that "aggressive patrol" stop
and frisk tactics were known to be focused on black men).
308 Prokos & Padavic, supra note 2.
309 Id. at 439.
3 ld. at 446.
2009]
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
of police work in the United States., 311 That message about masculinity is
reinforced during post-academy training, both formal and informal.312
When policemen are both provided discretion by legal doctrine and
taught to accept the hegemonic pattern of police masculinity during their
training, bullying will follow. Masculinized policemen will adopt the
"culture of honor" stance and hypermasculine behavior with civilians. They
will also enact command presence as a means of punishing disrespect. They
will initiate masculinity contests. The problem that we face, therefore, is
that the macho culture of policing triggers officers to use their Terry stop
and frisk powers to bully civilians.
B. The Proposal
Recognizing that police bullying is a product of our way of
thinking, Harris endorses a move toward a restorative justice model of
policing. As I have noted, part of the problem is that the present model of
policing, focusing as it does on the demonstration of a command presence,
is consistent with the hegemonic pattern of masculinity. The emphasis on
command presence is part of a punitive model of policing. A restorative
justice model would bring together the various individuals affected by the
offense and have them agree on how to repair the harm caused rather than
just punish the harm doer.313 This would reject the punitive model's
preoccupation with measuring the amount of pain that must be inflicted on
314the harm doer in order to balance the wrong. Demonstrating mastery over
the harm doer would no longer be the system's goal and that change might
change police officers' beliefs that they must master the potential criminal
by means of a command presence. Instead, the officer's goal would be to
obtain a full understanding of the situation. Dominating the suspect through
command presence would be an ineffective means of accomplishing the
new goal. Harris's proposal thus has the potential to reduce police bullying.
Although I am in favor of a move from a punitive model of policing toward
a restorative model, I am not sanguine about the likelihood of
311 Id. at 442.
312 See Robert W. Benson, Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform,
34 L.A. L. REV. 681, 682 (2001) (noting police-macho culture).
313 See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realized or





accomplishing that shift in the short term. After all, even the move to the
slightly more restorative community policing model has been resisted.315
It may be, though, that we can more directly affect police bullying
by changing how we train police forces. This subsection will establish that
new forms of training are necessary by showing that current forms of
training fail to teach officers appropriate rules for enacting command
presence. It will further establish that new forms of training can counter
masculinism in policing. Finally, it will describe what the new training
should look like.
1. The Current Training Regime Fails Us
In order to advocate for new forms of training, it must be
established that the present training system is broken. I do so by showing
that current training ignores the problem of masculinism in policing and
even exacerbates it. For example, at present, police academies usually train
extensively in the technical and mechanical aspects of policing- providing
instruction on how to subdue or disarm suspects.36 Academies have that
focus because of safety concerns. However, an officer may have "little
guidance as to what he should do when confronted by a serious verbal
challenge to his authority." 
317
Not only do police academies fail to train officers on the
appropriate use of command presence, they may actually provide
counterproductive messages. This begins with indoctrination into the
present macho police culture. During their training, cadets may be
315 See generally HERBERT, supra note 121, at 94-109 (describing police
department resistance to community policing).
316 See Alison T. Chappel et al., Law Enforcement Training: Changes and
Challenges, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 71, 73 (5th ed.
2005) ("Recruits spend 90 percent of their training on firearms, driving, first aid, and self-
defense, and other use-of-force tactics even though only 10 percent of their job duties will
put them in positions where they need these skills."); see also Quint C. Thurman, Preparing
Police Officers for Success, in CONTEMPORARY POLICING: CONTROVERSIES, CHALLENGES,
AND SOLUTIONS 165, 173 (Quint C. Thurman & Johong Zhao eds., 2004) ("The reliance on a
traditional curriculum and the reluctance to incorporate new training subjects, however
valuable they might be, is due primarily to the idea that policing is a particularly dangerous
occupation.").
317 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 106 (Vintage Books Edition 1983)
(1975) [hereinafter WILSON, THINKING] (finding that recruits are not well trained in verbal
confrontations).
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negatively affected by the "resocializing" effects of training.318 That is,
academy training encourages cadets to adopt a worldview in which police
officers are a distinct group whose actions are dictated by the
dangerousness of the occupation. 319 Further, cadets are introduced to a
police occupational 320 culture that is deeply rooted in machismo 321 and
militarism.322 Both ideals foster aggression and the need to dominate
civilians,323 ultimately leading to masculinity contests between officers and
civilians.324
318 See Thurman, supra note 316, at 167 (finding that traditional training creates a
negative mindset towards civilians).
319 Thurman says, "Academy training serves to 'resocialize' the new recruits
helping them to devalue their old way of looking at the world and replace it with a new view
that fits the job and the labor force that is responsible for providing police services." Id.
320 See Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality, in POLICE VIOLENCE:
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 29, 29-30 (William A. Geller
& Hand Toch eds., 1996) [hereinafter POLICE VIOLENCE] (distinguishing occupation culture
versus organizational culture). According to Worden:
"The" police culture is an occupational culture, consisting of outlooks
and norms that are commonly found among patrol officers in police
agencies. This culture emphasizes the danger and unpredictability of the
work environment, the consequent dependence of officers on each other
for assistance and protection, officers' autonomy in handling situations,
and the need to assert and maintain one's authority .... One may find
variation in the organizational culture of police departments, even while
one finds consistency in the elements of the occupational culture.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
321 See Benson, supra note 312, at 682 (noting police-macho culture).
322 According to Benson:
Police departments have always been organized as military-style
hierarchies, but in recent decades they have gone beyond organization to
mimic military tactics in the streets. This means, among other things, a
maximum use of force even in minor situations, use of heavy,
sophisticated gear and equipment, a threatening and hostile demeanor
toward the public, and a siege mentality in which the police dehumanize
the citizens into enemies in a war which must be won at all costs.
Id. at 687.
323 See id. (discussing police aggression).
324 See id. at 683 (finding that police machismo causes hostile confrontations with
the public); see also James J. Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian Violence, in POLICE
Who's the Man?
The worst results of police cadet indoctrination into masculinism
are incidents of brutality such as the Rodney King beating. The Christopher
Commission, created to investigate the LAPD in the wake of the Rodney
King beating, found an organizational culture that viewed police work as a
male occupation requiring masculine qualities.3 25 Unfortunately, "[a]
corollary of that culture is an emphasis on use of force to control a situation,
and disdain for a more patient, less aggressive approach. ' 326 Further, in
Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform, legal scholar
Robert W. Benson describes the effect of police hypermasculinity as
follows:
The practical results of this police machismo are that male
officers get themselves involved in hostile confrontations with
the public, use of excessive force, shootings, drug dealing, and
apparently as we see now in the Rampart Scandal, framing of
suspects through deceit and lies.
32 7
Note that Benson is basically talking about the hegemonic patterns
of U.S. masculinity in general and police masculinity in particular.
Policemen who need to dominate other men engage in masculinity contests
with civilians that they resolve through various forms of violence.328 Police
misconduct is thus a natural result of training that reinforces masculinism.
VIOLENCE, supra note 320, at 165, 168 [hereinafter Fyfe, Training to Reduce] (discussing
factors leading to confrontations). Fyfe describes the genesis of police-initiated masculinity
contests:
Unnecessary force . . .begins with police intervention into relatively
minor conditions that escalate into violence because of police haste
and/or inability to establish communication with the people involved.
Sometimes this occurs because officers are unfamiliar with the folkways
of racial or ethnic minority groups. Many brawls and much bloodshed
have followed when officers have inadvertently challenged the manhood
and pride of Hispanic young men during interventions in disputes and in
disorderly street-comer groups.
Id.
325 See INDEP. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 88 (describing LAPD
organizational culture).
326 id.
327 Benson, supra note 312, at 683.
328 See Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2001) (arguing that masculinism leads to police misconduct);
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To avoid police misconduct, we will need a new form of training.
As Joseph Wambaugh, a fourteen-year veteran of the LAPD, says in a 1991
interview, "police work is not about physical altercations . . . [or] about
shooting people .... It's about talking to people and problem solving[.]
' 329
So, police training that emphasizes aggression ill-prepares officers for their
more common task of negotiating conflicts without an arrest.330 This means
that macho models of police training need to be reformed.331
2. Training Can Help Diminish Police Misconduct
If masculinist training is the problem, anti-masculinist training may
provide an essential answer-adjusting the behavior of cadets and police
officers. 332 Specifically, training can change the occupational culture of
police departments.333 The goal is to change the training in departments that
currently teach officers to adopt an "us versus them" attitude, to always be
suspicious of civilians, to view them as potential threats, and to act
aggressively towards them.334 Training can help to solve the problem
see also Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police
Misconduct, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 746 (2001) ("[T]he hypermasculine gendering of
police work has led to corruption, excessive force, and extreme violence that harms everyone
in society, as individuals and as groups, and threatens to destroy the social order it ostensibly
established and enforces.").
329 Gale, supra note 328, at 725 (internal quotations omitted).
330 See, e.g., STEVEN M. COX, POLICE: PRACTICES, PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS 129
(1996) (arguing that while law enforcement is a critical part of policing, order maintenance is
more important in terms of both time spent and citizen satisfaction).
331 See Mary 0' Rawe, Human Rights, Transitional Societies and Police Training:
Legitimating Strategies and Delegitimating Legacies, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. L. COMM. 199, 244
(2007) (criticizing force-driven policing models as ineffective).
332 See Mitchell Caldwell et al., If It's Broken, Fix it: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IowA L. REV. 669, 735 (1998) (determining that education and training
appeared to positively affect understanding of the law and compliance therewith).
333 See Levenson, supra note 328, at 15 (finding culture of police is determined by
training and recruitment); see also Fyfe, Training to Reduce, supra note 324, at 166 ("The
goals of training, however, go beyond the transmission of skills and techniques and the
suppression of a few officers' hostile impulses. Police training also has an attitudinal
component: it socializes officers into their departments and teaches them their employers'
philosophies, values, and expectations.").
334 See Thurman, supra note 316, at 167 (finding that "the traditional academy
curriculum and the war stories told by police veterans help to build a chasm between those
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because it is a primary source of the problem.335 Training need not be
effective in actually changing particular officers' biases and views as long
as it teaches officers what conduct is acceptable while they are wearing the
badge.336
Based on what we learned from the field of masculinities studies,
the goal of training should be to get police officers to act with restraint
when they face situations where their authority is questioned. Police
departments may be reluctant to reform their current training because of the
crowded curriculum and the difficulty in teaching abstract concepts.337 But
those police departments should be motivated by fear of lawsuits338 and
poor public opinion that could result from a lack of proper communication
training.339 Further, many police officers agree that more training is needed
in order to better understand their roles, especially in using force.340
Although the present regime fails us, we can train officers to be
reluctant to use Terry stops and frisks to enact command presence.
Criminologist Steven Cox provides reasons for teaching such reluctance in
his book, Police: Practice, Perspectives, Problems. He states:
The importance of these [communication] skills is most clearly
illustrated by focusing on those officers who lack them. Such
officers are unlikely to get cooperation from diverse segments of
the public, either because they alienate other citizens by assuming
an authoritative stance as a defense for their poor communication
skills, or because they cannot express clearly and convincingly
people who are sworn to uphold the law and those other people-civilians-who are seen as
potential victims, witnesses, and offenders ... ").
335 See Levenson, supra note 328, at 15 (arguing that police aggression is a product
of recruitment, training, and supervision).
336 See Jerome L. Blakemore et al., From the Classroom to the Community:
Introducing Process in Police Diversity Training, 18 POLICE STUD. 71, 76 (1995) ("Culture
diversity training programs will be most effective by focusing on changing behavior, not
attitudes.").
337 Thurman, supra note 316, at 173.
338 id.
339 See Nancy Marion, Police Academy Training: Are We Teaching Recruits What
They Need to Know?, 21 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT. 54, 75 (1998)
(discussing how police officer machismo negatively affects public opinion).
340 Editorial, Misperceptions Feed Zero-Tolerance Scare, BALT. SUN, Apr. 9, 2000,
at 2C (finding police officers want more training particularly in the use of force).
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what they want or need the public to do. They receive little input
from the public about crime or their own performances. They
routinely enforce the law in an attempt to maintain order when
their more skilled colleagues could have maintained order
without resorting to arrest. They become unnecessarily involved
in physical encounters.
341
The key is that officers without these requisite communications
skills are more likely to enact command presence in situations where it is
not actually required. In contrast, well-trained officers can use
communications skills to defuse potentially explosive situations without
enacting command presence.34 2 Education and training of both cadets and
veteran officers will likely be the most effective method of preventing
unnecessary and harmful masculinity contests because training can help
officers maintain order without enacting extreme forms of command
presence.343
3. The Form That Retraining Should Take
Cadet training is usually a two-step process. Cadets are first trained
at an academy and then on the streets by experienced officers known as
field training officers (FTOs). In order to effectively teach officers how to
appropriately use command presence, both phases of the training process
must be adapted. Additionally, because informal training continues once a
cadet becomes an independent officer, police departments must consider the
messages they are sending their officers by means of which behaviors they
reward and which ones they punish.
i. Academy Training
To understand what academy training should look like, we must
know what it currently looks like. As Corey Hirokawa points out in her
article, Making the Law of the Land the Law of the Street: How Police
Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, training academies
341 Cox, supra note 330, at 129.
342 Id. (discussing the importance of officer communication skills).
34 3But cf Susan Bisom Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The
Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession,




respond to ambiguous legal doctrine by giving cadets standards that reflect
a cautious interpretation of the law.344 One might think that would lead to
cautious officers, but instead it merely reflects the fact that "the typical
police recruit is not interested in learning the intricacies of legal
decisions[..], 345 Consequently, trainers try to boil the law down into simple
either/or rules.346 Unfortunately, unlike some aspects of police training, the
appropriate time to use command presence is difficult to teach through strict
guidelines or rules. Officers have to use their discretion in deciding whether
command presence is necessary in a situation that could be read as either
threatening or benign. Consequently, the present form of academy training
is ill-equipped to teach the appropriate use of command presence.
Despite the inadequacy of present academy training regimes,
research suggests that police officers can be trained to make proper choices
about when to use Terry stops and frisks to enact command presence.347 As
criminologist James Fyfe shrewdly explains in his essay Training to Reduce
Police-Civilian Violence, "[t]he development of successful boxers,
diplomats, combat soldiers, and trial lawyers demonstrates that maintaining
one's temper under stressful and confrontational conditions is a skill that
can be taught." 348 Citing the work of Gerald Uelemn, Fyfe notes that police
shooting rates correlate strongly with the personal philosophies of police
officers and the policies of their Chiefs.349 In other words, a belief in the
344 Corey F. Hirokawa, Making the "Law of the Land" The Law on the Street: How
Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 297 (2000)
(finding that when the law is vague, departments teach their officers overly prudent rules).
141 Id. at 320.
346 Id.
341 Id. at 427.
348 Fyfe, Training to Reduce, supra note 324, at 165. Fyfe continues, "For police
trainers, this translates into convincing officers that they should not take personally the
insults and attacks they may experience at work." Id. at 166.
349 Id. Fyfe expresses similar views in another text:
Police officers and the people at whom they shoot are simply actors in a
much larger play. When police officers' roles in this play are defined
carefully by their administrators and when the officers have been trained
well to perform these roles, their individual characteristics mean
little. . . .When such clear expectations are not provided, officers
improvise, and often we give their performances bad reviews.
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appropriateness of aggression and a lack of supervision can lead to
excessive force. In line with this Article's suggestion that police
indiscretion has increased as a result of the rise of "law and order" ideology,
Fyfe found that "police shootings in Philadelphia had more to do with
whether 'law and order' politician Frank Rizzo was Mayor than with any
quantifiable measure of threats to police officers lives or safety. '35° So law
and order ideology leads first to increased police discretion and then to
increased police use of excessive force. We need academy training that
reinforces a department-wide norm of only adopting extreme forms of
command presence when it is truly necessary.
In order to train police officers to appropriately confront civilians,
academy training should teach officers how to effectively communicate
with civilians who challenge their authority.351 The Christopher
Commission concluded that ideal training would "develop and employ
tactics that emphasize containment and control rather than confrontation
and physical force. 3 52 So, the training should develop calmness, self-
respect, the ability to tolerate ambiguous situations, and the ability to apply
legal concepts in concrete situations so that the officer can respond flexibly
in the field.353 The training must also "appeal to officers' inherent value
systems by incorporating problem-solving situations that address real-life
situations., 354 In his essay, Learning the Skills of Policing, David H. Bayley
says that in order to reduce police use of excessive force, officers should be
"encouraged to think reflectively about the cues that should be used to
shape decisions and those that should not., 355 Trainers could involve cadets
James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, in POLICE PERSPECTIVES:
AN ANTHOLOGY 426-27 (Larry K. Gaines & Gary W. Cordner eds., 1999) [hereinafter
POLICE PERSPECTIVES].
350 Fyfe, Training to Reduce, supra note 324, at 166.
351 HEATHER MAC DONALD, ARE COPS RACIST? 147-48 (2003) (concluding that
police training should concentrate on communication skills).
352 INDEP. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 105.
353 See WILSON, THINKING, supra note 317, at 112.
314 Alicia M. Hilton, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v.
Michigan: Preventing and Remedying Police Misconduct, 53 VILL. L. REV. 47, 75 (2008).
355 David H. Bayley, Learning the Skills of Policing, in POLICE PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 349, at 224, 236.
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in simulations and discussions that encourage them to think about the
negative consequences of prematurely enacting command presence.
356
In addition to those methods, the key to deterring officers from
prematurely enacting command presence during Terry stops and frisks will
be using training to instill respect for the law. As Andrew Taslitz says in his
article, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, "[p]olice training at the academy and
beyond must emphasize how compliance with reasonable suspicion ... can
build community trust, thus enhancing candor and assistance." 357 The
various forms of police training must embed that attitude in the very culture
of the police.358
To accomplish that change, academy training must alert officers to
the subconscious biases that might lead them to use Terry stops and frisks
to prematurely enact command presence. Anthony Thompson's article
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment is instructive
on this point.359 Thompson uses social science research on stereotyping to
demonstrate the high risk of racial profiling that was created by the Terry
decision and then reinforced by the Whren v. United States decision.360 One
of Thompson's key proposed solutions is police training on racial
profiling. 361 He first establishes that such training is necessary to change
officers' racial biases and can be effective in doing so. 362 Next, he describes
the type of training necessary: "[T]raining should include exercises that
encourage officers to confront their own biases and to examine the risk of
resorting to stereotypic judgments in cross-racial encounters. This training
would draw on social science data to explore both the legitimate and
illegitimate use of classifications in investigations. 363 Like Bayley, then,
Thompson thinks that getting officers to think reflectively about why they
356 Id. at 236-37.
357 Andrew E. Taslitz, Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483, 568 (2006).
358 Id. at 569.
359 Thompson, supra note 15.
360 Whren v. United States, 516 U.S. 1036 (1996) (holding that racial pretext for
making a stop does not vitiate otherwise objectively valid probable cause).
361 See Thompson, supra note 15, at 1009.
361 Id. at 1011.
363 id.
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act in particular ways can reduce the use of force. It is reasonable to think
that if training can address racial bias, it can address macho behavior.
One specific method for officers to deal with obstreperous civilians
without resorting to macho behavior seems to be particularly effective: a
course called "verbal judo." The instructor teaches cadets to deflect verbal
abuse and then verbally manipulate people into compliance.364 The
instructor teaches cadets not to confuse their ego with their role as an
enforcer of the law: "The professional knows how to deflect verbal abuse
without escalating a confrontation. 365 This training thus helps to break
policemen's habit of linking respect for their authority to their masculine
esteem by instead linking their esteem to their verbal capabilities.366 In
1991, the Christopher Commission recommended that the LAPD institute
verbal judo as the first class in academy training and have it serve as the
foundation for other classes.367 This method of training would most likely
be extremely effective in decreasing needless masculinity contests and
should be adopted by more academies. In conjunction with the anti-
stereotyping training suggested by Thompson, verbal judo is the type of
academy training that police departments should adopt.
ii. Field Training
In order for officers to adjust to and effectively use their new anti-
stereotyping and verbal judo skills, field training officers (FTOs) must
reinforce the new techniques. Because FTOs teach new officers police
policies and ethics, they have an extraordinary influence on officers'
364 See MAC DONALD, supra note 351, at 134-35. But see JOHN P. CRANK &
MICHAEL A. CALDERO, POLICE ETHICS: THE CORRUPTION OF A NOBLE CAUSE 222, 233 (2000)
(criticizing verbal judo). Crank and Caldero question the value of verbal judo:
We've brought this up with command officers before, and sometimes we
hear 'well, we were having some problems, but we started giving classes
in verbal judo.' Verbal judo? What are you trying to do, verbally
outfight the public? A class in simple verbal courtesy would go a long
way. It might give your officers the idea that police work is a public
service. Wouldn't that be a good thing?
Id.
365 
MAC DONALD, supra note 351, at 135.
366 See discussion supra Part I.B (identifying the hegemonic pattern of police
officer masculinity).
367 See INDEP. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 123.
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conduct and attitude.3 68 Unfortunately, FTOs sometimes teach new officers
that their academy training is useless in the real world.369 Field Training
Officers are often the primary people who teach rookies that it is
appropriate to use command presence and physical force when they are
merely disrespected. 370 The FTOs must change their own views, or at least
instill the same ideals as the academy, so that new officers can
appropriately use the skills they have learned. In order to change the FTOs'
views, FTOs could also be trained in using anti-stereotyping and verbal
judo methods. For that training to be effective, however, police
administrators must convince the FTOs that adopting a new view on
command presence and civilian disrespect is the best course of action.
371
The combination of academy and FTO instruction on proper
communication will help rookies appropriately use command presence.
iii. In-Service Training and Informal Training
Training does not end when a prospect completes his field training.
Supervisors and more experienced officers informally train other officers by
tolerating or punishing inappropriate aggressive behavior.372 Therefore, in-
368 Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 780 (1993) ("Field Training
Officers, in particular, have a tremendous influence in defining the 'unwritten' department
policies."); see also Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34
GA. L. REV. 1253, 1295 (2000) ("Moreover, what happens in the classroom is far less
important than what happens after new recruits are paired with their field training officers,
who often advise them to forget their formal training and to learn what policing is really
about by observing experienced officers in action.").
369 See INDEP. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 125.
370 Lawrence Sherman, Learning Police Ethics, in POLICE PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 349, at 301 (listing punishment of disrespect as a key value that veterans teach rookies).
371 Kenneth J. Peak et al., Supervising the Police, in POLICE AND POLICING:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 37, 51-52 (Dennis Jay Kenney ed., 2d ed. 1999) (discussing how to
get supervisors to adopt new attitudes).
372 See Taslitz, supra note 357, at 569. Taslitz describes the learning process that is
necessary:
Education must, however, not be limited to the classroom. The learning
process must be constant. Policy bulletins, the modeling of behavior by
superiors, and clear rules to guide rookies are among the many ways to
build a culture of compliance. It is the constant effort to do better that
matters, as one expert on police ethics, T.E. Wren, has said: What is
740 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 18:3
service training of supervisors on communication skills should be a part of
every department's curriculum. Fyfe makes this point well:
Everything that supervisors do or tolerate, every interpretation of
broad departmental philosophy, every application of specific rules and
policies is a training lesson that has at least as much impact on officers'
performance as what they may have learned in their rookie days .... Worse,
when officers see firsthand that the behavioral structures in which they were
schooled are routinely ignored in practice, formal training is neutralized and
the definitions of appropriate behavior are instead made in the secrecy of
officers' locker rooms.373
Therefore, supervisors and commanders must not only carefully
lead their departments, they should also be trained in proper use of
aggression and communication.374 Like the training provided for FTOs,
training of supervisors must convince them that it is important to promote
only appropriate use of command presence.375 Further, to ensure that
supervisors send the right message, some part of their pay should be linked
to a lack of incidents of excessive force.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHY BULLIES ARE NEVER HAPPY
I began this Article by noting the way in which men play a game of
"who's the man?" I then traced the need to play that game to its source in
the hegemonic pattern of United States masculinity. Further, I identified
police officers as a class of men who may be especially prone to playing
that game. Officers may be tempted to use Terry stops and frisks to enact
command presence in order to stage masculinity contests. That is,
policemen may be tempted to bully other men solely to boost their
needed, then, is an approach to police formation that instills a passionate
commitment to the law into the most intimate parts of a policeman's
personality structure and self interpretation and simultaneously
incorporates this attitude with the tacit norms and expectations that bind
the police fraternity together.
Id.
373 Fyfe, Training to Reduce, supra note 324, at 166-67.
374 See id. at 177-78 (emphasizing importance of supervisors).
375 See Peak et al., supra note 371, at 51-52 ("It is widely held that the most




masculine esteem. Accordingly, I proposed rooting out the bullying instinct
by reforming police training.
Aside from the question of whether policemen should bully
civilians, we might ask whether such actions can ever actually sate the
desire to prove one's masculinity. According to Kimmel, they cannot:
[T]he bully is the least secure about his manhood, and so he is
constantly trying to prove it. But he proves it by choosing
opponents he is absolutely certain he can defeat; thus the standard
taunt to a bully is to "pick on someone your own size." He can't,
though, and after defeating a smaller and weaker opponent, which
he was sure would prove his manhood, he is left with the empty
gnawing feeling that he has not proved it after all, and he must
find another opponent, again one smaller and weaker, that he can
again defeat to prove it to himself. . . . When does it end?
Never.
376
So bullying is a counter-productive activity for the bully himself.
Because of the authority invested in policemen, the officer who picks a
civilian to stage a masculinity contest with is not picking on someone his
own size. So he will have to bully again and again without ever
satisfactorily proving his manhood.
The bully's conundrum demonstrates that no one really benefits
from the current structure of masculinity. Ultimately, hegemonic
masculinity is the source of the problem of police harassment of men. The
surest way to eliminate this problem is to eliminate the present hegemonic
pattern of masculinity. There was a 1971 anthology called Unbecoming
Men that contained a set of early thoughts on the men's movement toward
less sexism. 37 7 That title suggests that we ought to be deconstructing the
very concept of what it means to be a man. Likewise, the very title of John
Stoltenberg's book, Refusing to be a Man, suggests we can train men to
reject the present hegemonic model of manhood.37 8 Unfortunately, we
cannot accomplish that task within a time frame that is acceptable to the
many victims of police bullying. But that does not mean we should not try.
In the short term, this Article recommends changing police training as we
376 Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 3, at 32-33.
377 UNBECOMING MEN: A MEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING GROUP WRITES ON
OPPRESSION AND THEMSELVES (Mark Bradley & Lonnie Danchik eds., 1971).
378 See generally JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN: ESSAYS ON SEX AND
JUSTICE (1989) (criticizing the present expectations of manhood).
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know it; for the long term, it endorses the unmaking of masculinity as we
know it.
